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EU Enlargement to the East and Labour Migration to the West

Lessons from previous enlargements for the
introduction of the free movement of workers
for Central and East European Countries

Simone Goedings



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Simone Goedings

International Institute of Social History
Amsterdam

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List of abbreviations

CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEc	Central European country
CEEc	Central and East European country
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSFR	Former Czechoslovakia
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
EURES	European Employment Services
IOM	International Organization for Migration

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Introduction¹

When the Council of Ministers agreed to consider enlargement of the European Union to include Central and East European countries (CEECs) at the Amsterdam summit in 1997, it opened the door to the extension of all EU provisions to the applying CEECs, including the free movement of workers. The prospect raised questions especially with respect to this EU provision, which would enable the citizens of the CEECs to enter the territory and the labour markets of the present members to seek and accept employment. Economic and social conditions in many CEECs and the rise of East-West migration after the fall of the Berlin Wall raises the fear that opening the EU labour markets, as prescribed by the free movement of workers, will lead to massive migratory movements from Eastern to Western Europe.

The upcoming enlargement, however, will not be the first introduction of free movement of workers in new member states, nor is it the first time that these concerns are expressed. During the gradual introduction of the free movement of workers² at the Common Market's establishment, diplomats also worried about massive flows from Italy to the other five founding countries. The sentiment recurred at the respective admissions of Greece in 1981 and of Portugal and Spain in 1986,³ when the introduction of free movement with these labour-sending countries was expected to instigate large migration flows. In none of those cases did these fears materialize after free movement was introduced, since this particular EU provision has never stimulated nor supported large-scale labour migration.⁴ The EU's extensive experience with the introduction of free movement indicates complementing the many political and economic research publications addressing the issue with a historical approach.

This study discusses the possible effect of enlarging the European Union to include the CEECs on the free movement of workers from the perspective of past EC enlargements. Previous experiences with the introduction of free movement of workers and the theory of international migration provide a basis for devising a set of variables in Part I. These variables are projected upon the actual migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe to anticipate the influence of the introduction of free movement on migratory flows. In addition to examining East-West flows, the analysis will cover the possible impact of the expansion of free movement with CEECs upon migratory movements towards CEECs and transit migration in CEE. The approach is indicative rather than definitive, first of all because free movement of workers concerns only legal movements, whereas present East-West migration is often illegal due to restrictive West European immigration policies. Moreover, the accession of the CEECs will take some time and, more importantly, the pattern of labour migration from and within Central and Eastern Europe has been changing in recent years. This study examines, therefore, the migration flows that would actually arise if free movement were introduced today.

The overview of the migration flows is derived from secondary sources, publications and published statistical data. Migration literature generally agrees that statistical data concerning international migration movements are very poor and - if available - are usually incomplete, dated, and lacking in detail. In many cases they are incompatible, since the concepts and definitions used for collecting statistical information vary greatly between countries, both in the CEECs and throughout Western Europe.⁵ To generate the most

-
1. The author is grateful to Annette Bosscher and Lambert Schmidt for their support and advice during the research leading to this study. I am also indebted to Jan Lucassen and Richard Griffiths, who enabled me to conduct research at the International Institute of Social History and the History Department of Leiden University. Rinus Penninx and Jeroen Doomerink contributed helpful ideas and comments about the study. Finally, thanks are due to Corso Boccia, Peter Wells, and Giep van Werven for all their comments and support.
 2. The free movement of workers provision of the Treaty of Rome, Art 48/49, was devised between 1959 and 1968 by three successive regulations: Regulation 15 of 1961, Regulation 48 of 1964, and Regulation 1612 of 1968, which established the system.
 3. Greece joined the EC in 1981, and free movement was introduced for this country in 1988. Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 and were originally scheduled to have free movement of workers throughout the EU in 1993 but actually received it in 1991.
 4. See e.g.: R.W. Böhning (1972), W. Mole & A. van Mourik (1988), T. Straubhaar (1988), R. Penninx & P.J. Muus (1989), H. Werner (1976 and 1977), G. N. Yannopoulos (1969).
 5. As stated by: J. Salt & J.A. Clarke (1996); OECD SOPEMI and the IOM reports about transit migration.

comprehensive possible depiction of migratory movements in Central and Eastern Europe, the study draws upon both official statistics and research projects⁶ based on information from border guards, airport officials, refugee camps and humanitarian centres, non-governmental organizations and embassies, and interviews with immigrants and asylum seekers. This strategy enables us to understand the plans and motivations of migrants (which would exceed the scope of a purely statistical analysis) and, since many of the migrants are illegal, renders a more informed representation of the situation than official statistics would provide.

My idea for this study arose during my traineeship at the European Commission in 1996. During this traineeship I was closely involved in the Commission's work regarding the accession of CEECs in the area of the free movement of workers. In addition to gaining a solid grasp on the enlargement issue, I found the lessons of past enlargements useful for understanding the possible impact of the introduction of free movement in the applying CEECs upon migratory flows. The discussion about the EU's historical experiences is rather brief and concrete in this study and draws upon my forthcoming dissertation at the European University Institute in Florence. I conducted the research for this study at the International Institute of Social History and at the History Department of Leiden University.

Amsterdam, August 1998

6. The following publications use these kinds of data: H. Fassmann (1997); H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann (1997); C. Wallace & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko (1996) and the IOM reports about transit migration.

1. Lessons from the past

During the 1950s and 1960s several international European organizations besides the EC - such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Benelux and the Nordic Council⁷ - took steps to abolish legal barriers to international labour movements. This study concentrates on the effect of the introduction of free movement on intra-European Community migration flows and substantiates this discussion by reviewing the experiences of other European organizations in this field. The EC case study commences with the gradual introduction of the right of freedom of movement for workers during the Common Market's transition period.⁸ After the system was completed in 1968 by the enforcement of regulation 1612, free movement was established between the Community and new member states during the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986.⁹

Many studies have addressed the effect of the introduction of free movement on intra-Community labour migration. All have demonstrated that such changes have very little impact on the size and direction of international labour movements. Intra-Community migration regulated by free movement was generally limited to the movement of highly skilled workers, frontier migration, and short-term circular migration. In no case did large-scale movements occur. Understanding the EC's past experiences in this field and using them to estimate the possible effects of the introduction of free movement after the future accession of Central and East European countries requires examining *why* previous introductions of free movement never seriously affected intra-Community migration flows. Was this limited effect attributable to the system's structure, or did it result from the particular circumstances surrounding the introduction of free movement? In case the system was the main reason for the limited outcome, future introductions might also be expected to have relatively little impact on labour migration. If, however, the particular circumstances at the time of the introduction were responsible, then future introductions under different circumstances might very well affect intra-Community labour movements. In this case, predicting the course of events will be far more difficult.

1.1 Scope and limitations of the system of free movement of workers

The establishment and progression of the free movement of workers during the 1950s and 1960s aroused little public interest but often elicited strong objections among national governments and social partners. Trade unions and employers' organizations either reacted negatively or showed little interest in the matter (B. Barnouin, 1986; R.C. Beever, 1969, and M. Bouvard, 1972). The result was that the lobby for the free movement of workers was minimal (G. Rosenthal, 1975). Only the supranational institutions, the High Authority in the case of the ECSC and the European Commission, and the Italian government advocated establishing such legislation (K.A. Dahlberg, 1968). Italy strongly supported the liberalization of intra-Community labour movements, because it saw free movement as a method to increase Italian emigration to North-western Europe and thus as a European solution to the country's unemployment problem (F. Romero, 1993), which had previously been dealt with through emigration to the Americas. The other member states were not in favour of free movement and strongly objected to its introduction. They feared it would lead to large and uncontrolled migration flows, which would undermine domestic labour market policies of full employment (F. Romero, 1993). Moreover, the leftist sympathies of the Italian working class were considered extremely dangerous during the Cold War period (K.A. Dahlberg, 1968). The

7. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, founded in 1948, began liberalizing international labour movements in 1953. The Benelux Labour Treaty and the Common Nordic Labour Market were introduced in 1956 and 1954, respectively. The first arrangement for free movement of workers between the Six originates from an ECSC decision in 1954 regarding the liberalization of the movement of miners and steelworkers within the ECSC area.

8. See Note 2.

9. See Note 3.

concern expressed by national governments at the time regarding uncontrolled migration flows proved unjustified, since free movement has thus far never given rise to large-scale and uncontrolled movements. Nevertheless, the virtual absence of any lobby for the free movement of workers affected the scope of the system, in that the definition of free movement was left to the opposition's discretion and therefore had a limited outcome.

Free movement of workers within the European Union comprises the abolition of legal frontiers against intra-Community labour migration. It is directed at national practices that hamper immigration by restricting the entry and movement of foreigners into the labour market, while granting preference to employment from the national labour force. The introduction of free movement for the purpose of employment entitles Community citizens to be treated the same as national workers. Abolition of national legislation and practices favouring citizens over their colleagues from within the Union allows Community citizens to seek and accept employment in any member state. This definition reveals that the system of free movement is subject to four general limitations, which have prevented its introduction from increasing the number of migrants substantially.

The first limitation in the system is that it targets a limited group of persons. The right of freedom of movement for workers is granted only to the citizens of the member states. Citizens of third countries, refugees, and stateless persons are excluded from the system and remain subject to national restrictions in their movements within the Communities. The group of free movement beneficiaries is also limited to employees, since the free movement of workers concentrates on paid employment with rights and obligations stemming from each member state's system of industrial relations. The economic sector and the type of employment are irrelevant as long as the person is an employee (H. Verschueren, 1990). Therefore, other types of migrants (e.g. family members, the self employed, contract workers, students, trainees, pensioners, and people living from private means) do not qualify as paid employees and thus cannot be identified as workers in the strict sense of the free movement legislation. Such persons fall outside the scope of the free movement of workers. Their migration within the Union - with the exception of family members whose movement is included in Regulation 1612 of 1968 - is governed by other Community provisions or by national legislation (H. Verschueren, 1990). When the free movement of workers within the Communities was established during the 1960s, as well as after its enactment, however, the largest migration flows in Western Europe consisted not of EC citizens but of third country nationals who were not granted the right of free movement. Furthermore, after the oil crisis heralded the first halt to the economic expansion of the 1960s, demand for foreign workers fell considerably. During the 1980s and 1990s growth in labour migration was surpassed by the rise in migration of family members and refugees (R. Penninx & P.J. Muus, 1989). In sum, free movement of workers did not coincide with the largest migration flows. Since the largest groups of migrants did not meet the provision's criteria (among other reasons) - either by virtue of their nationality or because they could not be identified as workers in the sense of free movement of workers - the introduction of free movement hardly altered existing flows.

The second limitation of the scope of free movement was that it facilitated only intra-Community migration. It neither took care of migration to the Communities nor dealt with movements from the integrated area to a third destination. The EEC case shows, however, that the largest migration flows were not within but into the Communities. During the 1960s, demand for foreign workers boomed, while the supply on the Italian labour market decreased as the delayed economic upswing finally increased the number of employment opportunities within the country. The Italian labour market was no longer sufficient to match the demand in the five other member states, which therefore had to recruit in third countries. Consequently, intra-Community migration was surpassed by the number of immigrants arriving from third countries (H. Werner, 1976 and 1977).

The system of free movement's third limitation resulted from its failure to establish or at least support strong and active linkages between the labour markets of its member states. Regulation 15 from 1961 established the European Office for Co-ordinating Vacancy Clearance. This office was supposed to have functioned as an intermediary between national employment offices. Mediation between these officials was to establish the contacts between demand and supply on the labour markets of different member states necessary for supporting and stimulating international labour migration. However, the system never came

into fruition and hardly functioned (R.W. Böhning, 1972). Until the recent establishment of EURES,¹⁰ no significant arrangement existed to balance supply and demand on the labour markets of different member states. Nor did the system of free movement support migration like the organized labour recruitment with state support under the bilateral labour treaties, which provided for financial and practical arrangements to simplify and reduce the cost of the recruitment procedure and for occupational and language training programmes for migrant workers (G.N. Yannopoulos, 1969: 245). Under the free movement of workers, Community citizens were free to seek and accept employment in all member states, and employers were able to employ Community citizens without governmental restrictions. Because it did not establish strong and active linkages between the labour markets of the member states and did not support migration actively in another way, free movement was not designed to stimulate or support large-scale labour migration.

The equal treatment requirement was the fourth limitation in the system of free movement. When Community citizens qualify as paid employees, they are entitled to equal treatment granted under the free movement of workers. Equal treatment regarding employment implies in the first place equal access to the labour market, meaning the right to seek and accept employment under the same conditions as the local workers. After commencing employment workers are entitled to reside in the country of employment and enjoy the same rights regarding pay, terms of employment, social security benefits, occupational training, and trade union membership as national workers.

Because of the equal wages requirement for national and Community workers, the right to equal treatment is a safeguard against social dumping. Equal employment conditions regarding pay and dismissal were established not only to protect foreign workers from being exploited, but more importantly because the provision would protect the national labour forces of the six founders of the free movement of workers against immigrants prepared to work for lower wages and conditions. The requirement of equal wages and working conditions prohibits employers from offering less favourable terms of employment to Community immigrants to reduce labour costs at the expense of national workers. As a matter of fact, because these foreign workers had to be offered wages at the national level, while the cost of their recruitment remained fairly constant, Community workers became more expensive than local workers or cheap labour from third countries and thus *less* attractive to employers.

For its founding member states, the requirement of equal treatment between national and Community workers was in the first place an assurance that Community workers would not compete with local workers for available jobs. Second, the negotiating states hoped that by abolishing the advantages in labour cost of employing immigrants at lower wages, equal treatment would lead employers to hire from the supply of national workers before recruiting in other member states. In other words, although free movement had abolished the legal preference for national workers on the labour market, most member states hoped that the requirement of equal treatment would maintain a *de facto* preference for national workers (S.A.W. Goedings, forthcoming 1999).

1.2 The right of free movement of workers and the rise of international migration

The introduction of the right to freedom of movement for workers is a step toward the abolition of legal impediments to migration. Does such action stimulate international migration? The impact of freedom of movement on the number of migrants depends on its interaction with three groups of variables in the migration process: the classical push and pull factors that cause migration, the intermediary structures connecting sending and receiving countries, and, finally, administrative policies stimulating, enabling, or restricting migration.¹¹ To understand the interference of freedom of movement in migration flows, we

10. EURES, *European Employment Services*, is the present employment office of the European Community. Its main tasks are to provide information and counselling in the areas of employment, social insurance, and vocational training. It places migrant workers in EU member states via close contacts with national public employment services, see EURES, 1995: 15.

11. See e.g. the model by J. Doornik, R. Penninx, and H. van Amersfoort (1996), which identifies factors stimulating

measured the effect of the process on these three areas.

Generally, migration flows arise from economic, political, and demographic differences between the origin and destination countries. These inequalities, known as the root causes, are necessary for the emergence and continuation of migratory movements. The abstract level of the root causes, though not intrinsically an adequate explanation of migration processes, may be elaborated in terms of four groups of classical push and pull forces. The first group concerns the classical economic supply and demand model. Here, labour market factors, such as unemployment in one country and demand for workers in another or wage differences between the two countries, stimulate migration. The second factor fuelling international migration is the political situation and political stability in particular, the protection of human rights, and the treatment of minorities. The third factor involves cultural definitions, for example general approval or disapproval of emigration or immigration. Demographic factors are the fourth and final category. In addition to overpopulation in sending and declining populations in receiving areas, the demographic composition of immigrant populations plays a role.¹²

Free movement of workers cannot be considered at the same level as the push and pull factors discussed above. Persons do not migrate simply because of the free movement of workers. Rather, they are stimulated by the push and pull factors. Overall, the effect and the efficiency of the Common Market may affect these push and pull factors. Elimination of legal hindrances to international migration as intended by the introduction of free movement of workers within the Common Market, however, does not interfere with differences in economic development, wages and prices, unemployment rates, and demand on the labour market and consequently does not cause international migration.

Thus, the right to migration cannot be said to "cause" international migration but may intervene with the flows in other ways. The classical push and pull factors stimulate migration. These conditions alone neither give rise to migration nor explain the direction of the flow.¹³ Two other conditions need to be met for migration to take place. First, a migration process requires at the very least passive cooperation from the governments of the sending and receiving countries. Administrative action with respect to migration varies from encouraging international movements by devising instruments to support the migrants (e.g. bilateral agreements with destination countries) to formulating policies aimed at preventing migratory movements. Active and supportive migration policies can stimulate migration, while preventive policies will reduce the number of immigrants and impede the process.¹⁴ The second necessary condition for migration flows to emerge concerns intermediary structures between the origin and destination countries. Five categories of intermediary structures connect immigration with emigration areas: state-to-state

international migration and structures them according to different levels of the migration process. The model depicts migration flows as movements in a migration network and thus not only discusses the push and pull factors but also considers the linkages between sending and receiving countries. During the last decade migration literature has emphasized the importance of networks for migratory movements, see e.g. several articles in: *International Migration Review* (1989) and M.M. Kritz (ed.) (1992).

12. If an immigrant population is beginning to establish its presence and thus usually predominantly male, family reunification and the immigration of brides will rise, particularly when national governments begin to restrict immigration and allow only migration for family purposes to continue. This was the case for Western Europe after the recession in the 1970s.
13. Economic literature, - see e.g. G.J. Borjas (1989) - following the demand-supply theory cannot account for the continuation of migration after the reduction of economic incentives. Furthermore, the income-maximization model, whereby individual migrant conduct is guided by the search for better opportunities, overlooks the fact that migrants do not always move towards the areas offering the best income. During the last decade scholars have stressed the importance of networks in shaping and sustaining migration flows, see A. Portes & J. Böröcz (1989). D.T. Gurak and F. Cases (1992) present an overview of recent literature dealing with intermediary structures connecting immigration and emigration countries.
14. Emigration can occur only if allowed and not actively prevented by the administration involved. The case of the former Soviet Block demonstrates the importance of border controls combined with internal control and penalties (M.M. Kritz & H. Zlotnik, 1992: 11; A.R. Zolberg, 1989: 405 and J. Doornik 1996: 57). Restrictive immigration policies will never completely stop determined migrants. Ordinarily, however, they will complicate planning migration and will in combination with other practical and psychological factors discourage many people with the desire to migrate from taking actual steps in that direction (M.M. Kritz & H. Zlotnik, 1992: 9).

relations, economic linkages, mass culture connections, family and personal relations,¹⁵ and migrant agency activities (see Figure 1, p. ?). These structures form linkages between both countries and involve legal and material connections providing migration opportunities and supporting the actual movement through the supply of information, transport, and financial and practical assistance.

The intermediary structures are very important in the decision-making process of potential migrants. Migration and labour migration in particular can be seen as an investment in which people weigh the advantages and disadvantages of their present and expected future residence and employment situation against potential alternatives abroad. After taking into account the risks and the expenses of migration, they decide whether to stay or leave (P.A. Fischer & T. Straubhaar, 1996). Higher wages, better working conditions, stable employment growth, and low unemployment levels are the main advantages attracting potential migrants. In addition to offering a significant incentive, the advantages of migration must exceed the cost of moving and the tendency toward inertia. Including migration networks in the analysis changes the situation considerably. Intermediary structures taking care of several practical and supportive matters are highly efficient cost-reducing mechanisms and thus create or enhance migration opportunities (D.T. Gurak & F. Caces, 1992). Migrants tend to move to areas offering the highest benefits and preferably in the closest proximity to reduce the material and psychological cost of migration (P.A. Fischer & T. Straubhaar, 1996). This pattern does not always apply, however, since most migrants move according to the possibilities available to them and select the best option, which may not be the most profitable one. Connections brought about by intermediary structures are therefore important in the decision-making process of potential migrants (D.T. Gurak & F. Caces, 1992: 156, 157, 159).

Figure 1 Linkages in international migration systems

Categories	Linkages
State to State Relations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 International relations: diplomatic and trade relationships, assistance programmes etc. 2 Past colonial and current neo or quasi-colonial bonds 3 Current immigration and emigration policies
Economic Linkages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Economic internationalization: off-shore production, multinationals etc. 2 Complementary labour markets
Mass Culture Connections	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Mass communication products: newspapers, television, films etc. 2 Attitudes of local population towards emigration and immigration 3 Similarities between cultures and languages
Immigrant Population	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Circle of family and friends 2 Migrant firms 3 Status of emigrants abroad acting as a role model for future immigrants
Migrant Agency Activities	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Administrative institutions 2 Private organizations

15. Of these five categories the strongest link between emigration and immigration areas is the presence of an immigrant population in the receiving country (M. Boyd, 1989). Immigrant populations function as a bridge between the country of origin and that of destination by providing new immigrants with information and financial and practical support, such as initial accommodations and assistance in finding employment. Other "bridges" include firms owned by immigrants, which recruit immigrant labour in their home countries, and migrant agencies in general, which assist governments in their recruitment policies or intercede for private companies and individual migrants. In addition to establishing contact between employers and workers, these agencies help migrants by arranging information, accommodations, and financial assistance.

Source: M. Boyd, "Family and Personal networks in Migration", *International Migration Review*, 23(3), 1989: 638-670; J.T. Fawcett, "Networks, Linkages and Migration Systems", *International Migration Review*, 23(3), 1989: 674, and S. Sassen, *Transnational Economies and National Migration Policies*, Amsterdam: IMES, 1996: 4.

What, then, is the significance of free movement with respect to these variables in the migration process? As discussed in Section 1.1, free movement is not the active administrative action that national recruitment policies were during the 1960s. It does not support the actual migration process, nor does it act as or bring about an intermediary structure. Accordingly, free movement has not established significant linkages between both ends of the migration process. Until the recent foundation of EURES,¹⁶ even contact between supply and demand on the labour markets of different member states (a necessary condition for labour migration flows to emerge) was not dealt with systematically. All these factors are important variables in international migration processes, because intermediary structures linking the sending and receiving areas influence the direction of the flows. Since free movement did not involve the establishment of intermediary structures (the effects of EURES have yet to be analysed), it hardly interfered with the direction of the flow.

As the elimination of restrictive and discriminatory hindrances to international migration, free movement is addressed through the policy and legislation variables in the migration process. It stimulates the functioning of the push and pull factors and the intermediary structures conducive to the flows. Where such structures were present, and migration was severely hampered by restrictive policies, the introduction of free movement (which partly eliminated these policies) might increase the numbers of migrants. On the other hand, when administrations allow or support manpower movements and hence the functioning of the push and pull factors without impeding the intermediary structures, the introduction of free movement will have little or no effect. The impact of the introduction of free movement on the numbers of migrants therefore depends on the extent that restrictive national policies hindered migration stimulated by push and pull factors and channelled through migration networks. In sum, the effects are contingent upon the circumstances prevailing at the time of the introduction of such free movement.

1.3 The importance of the circumstances prevailing upon the introduction of the free movement of workers

Aside from the limited scope of the legal structure of free movement of workers, the particular circumstances surrounding the introduction of free movement of workers are important in understanding why free movement did not give rise to large-scale intra-Community labour migration. Past experiences with the introduction of free movement reveal six particular circumstances that reduced the introduction's impact on the numbers of migrants.

The effect of the introduction of free movement depends primarily on the extent to which restrictive administrative actions had hindered the migration process previously. In other words, the measure stimulated or influenced migration only if it eliminated restrictive and discriminating policies that had hindered international migration. Throughout the 1960s, when the right to freedom of movement for workers was gradually introduced, however, Western Europe's booming economy had quickly exhausted the supply on the local labour force and had consequently given rise to a large demand for foreign labour in the industrialized centres of North-western Europe. The member states did not prohibit the new arrivals from Italy or any other emigration country. On the contrary, large-scale labour immigration was necessary to continue the economic upswing. Governments supported immigration through bilateral labour treaties and labour recruitment arrangements. Their aim was to guide the flows to areas with labour shortages rather than to restrict or to prohibit immigration. The introduction of free movement (intended to generate migration opportunities by abolishing legal hindrances) was not followed by a rise in immigration, because no significant legal barriers against immigration existed until the recruitment stop in 1973. As the

16. See Note 13

governments did little to restrict the flows, the introduction of free movement brought about few changes.

Second, labour market trends and in particular demand for labour determine migration flows under the free movement of workers regime. Four case studies demonstrate that intra-Community migration flows are related more to the pull than to the push factors. Migration from Italy to the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, was determined more by the German labour demand and unemployment figures there than by the labour market situation in Italy (R. Feithen, 1986). Böhning (1972) compared intra-Community migration flows with migration to two countries outside the EC framework (the United Kingdom and Switzerland) for the period 1968-1972. In all cases he found that the demand for labour determined the size of immigration (R. W. Böhning, 1972: 72-87). Analysis by R. Penninx and P.J. Muus (1989) of the size and direction of migration flows within the Common Nordic Labour Market (the Scandinavian agreement on free movement) confirms this picture. The fourth case study, which demonstrated that migration flows regulated by the free movement of workers are more demand than supply related, addresses changes in intra-Community migration during the 1970s. The recessions of the 1970s caused massive unemployment but did not result in an increase of the flows, as the changing of the economic climate also eliminated the demand for foreign workers. Nor did the accession of the three Mediterranean countries lead to large scale migration (regardless of the legal opportunities to emigrate arising from the abolition of restrictive policies concerning Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrant workers in the other member states), since the pull factors did not stimulate large scale emigration to North-western Europe (G. Wedell, 1980: 47, 48, 58).

The size and direction of migration flows upon the introduction of free movement are the third factor determining the impact of its introduction. In previous cases the introduction had not caused an increase in the numbers of migrants, either because migration between certain member states had not existed before, or because the flows had already peaked (as with Italian migration during the 1960s). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Italy was the labour surplus market of the Six. Large numbers of Italian emigrants made their way to the industrialized centres of North-western Europe. By the time free movement was introduced, the number of Italian emigrants to the other member states was already decreasing (G.N. Yannopoulos, 1979: 119). In the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish cases, the flows had also passed their maximum. They had even reversed themselves and were headed towards the country of origin. The improvement in the economies and labour markets of the three emigration countries at the end of the 1960s had stimulated return migration. On the pull side, the demand for foreign workers and consequently labour immigration had dropped sharply after the oil crisis of 1973. During the 1980s emigration from Greece, Portugal, and Spain was low compared with the massive waves of the 1960s. The abolition of restrictive national policies through the establishment of free movement did not bring about an increase in emigration, because the pull factors neither caused nor stimulated large-scale emigration of workers to North-western Europe (G. Wedell, 1980: 47, 48, 58).

Fourth, free movement of workers is not the only determinant of economic migration in the EC. The Union also regulates the movement of self-employed and contract workers migrating as part of the performance of a service. Employers using the services of self-employed and contract workers usually have lower labour costs and fewer risks and responsibilities than with hiring employees. Recently, labour flexibility and short-term contracts have been the trend on the labour market. Recruitment of contract workers and the self-employed is also gaining popularity. As a result, Community migrants are employed increasingly under the terms of the free supply of services and as self-employed workers, rather under the free movement of workers. Free supply of services and self-employment are thus ways to circumvent the transition periods set up for the free movement of workers. Between Portugal and Spain's accession to the EC and the end of transition period for free movement of workers, Portuguese and Spanish workers moved (albeit in far smaller numbers than during the 1960s) to other EC member states under the provisions for free supply of services and as self-employed workers. Unfortunately, few figures are available for these flows.

Demand for foreign workers and emigration opportunities outside the EC are the fifth reason why free movement did not result in large intra-EC migration. Free movement entitles Community citizens to emigrate within the Community and to receive equal pay and working conditions. Nevertheless, the workers decided whether or not to use this right. As explained in sections 1.1 and 1.2, migration regulated

by free movement continued to move according to the push and pull factors and was channelled by the intermediary structures and migrant networks. When these networks indicated better migration opportunities outside the EC, migrants moved to such destinations without hesitation. During the 1960s when free movement was introduced, only about one third of the Italian emigrants moved to an EC member state; the rest chose a third country (N. Malpas, 1989: 17). Switzerland attracted about one third of the Italian emigrants because of its high wages (among the highest in Europe at that time). Another 30 percent of the emigrants travelled overseas via immigrant networks.

Thus far we have analysed the circumstances traditionally believed to be the reasons why the introduction of free movement did not result in large-scale migration flows. Other circumstances at the time of the introduction (which are rarely considered) include the geographical distance between labour sending and recipient member states and the fact that free movement of workers was never introduced with a labour sending country sharing a long frontier with destination countries. Short distance and frontier migration were therefore not possible in these cases. The ECSC experiences have shown that the impact of free movement was especially strong in the case of cross-border migration. During the 1950s the demand for skilled workers in their country of origin combined with the minor increase of income due to small differences in real wages (High Authority, 1956) did not provide a major incentive to travel large distances to reach another country. One exception concerns the coal fields and the iron and steel plants artificially split by national frontiers. In these cases, workers could reside in their country of origin and work in another country. By commuting daily or weekly these workers increased their income significantly, since they earned high wages in for instance Belgium and enjoyed lower cost of living at home in the Netherlands or in the Federal Republic of Germany (High Authority, 1964). Extending the ECSC experiences to the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish case studies reveals that none of these countries share a long frontier with the other member states that might enable short-distance and frontier migration. The traditional emigration patterns of these countries (as for instance during the 1960s) consisted mainly of long-distance migration and not of short-distance or frontier migration. At present, the Pyrenees are a major obstacle to cross-border movements between Spain and France and enable only a small number of frontier workers cross the border daily or weekly (EURES, 1996: 46).

1.4 Conclusion

The introduction of the free movement of workers did not cause, fuel, or support large-scale intra-Community migration in the past, primarily because the measure was not intended for this purpose. As sections 1.1 and 1.2 show, the scope of the free movement of workers legislation is too narrow to stimulate large migration flows. Free movement of workers targets a limited group of persons comprising the citizens of the member states who are employees. Moreover, it focuses solely on migratory movements within the Union and does not interfere with migration to or from the Communities. Prior to the establishment of EURES, the system did not lead to strong and active linkages between the labour markets of member states or support migration in any other way. Finally, the requirement of equal wages and working conditions for national and Community workers alike prevented employers from offering less favourable employment contracts to Community immigrants to reduce labour costs. Therefore, free movement reduced the interest of employers in recruiting immigrant labour from other member states.

The second reason why free movement did not lead to larger migratory movements was that, as Section 1.3 demonstrates, the circumstances surrounding the introduction of free movement of workers were not conducive to an increase in the number of migrants. If these circumstances have changed over time, future introduction of free movement of workers might very well have a larger impact on labour movements within the European Union.

2. East-West Migration and the introduction of the free movement of workers between the present EU member states and the applying CEECs

2.1 East-West Migration: old patterns and current flows

The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the suspension of travel restrictions provided ample opportunities for East-West migration. CEE citizens rapidly appreciated these new opportunities and moved to countries such as the Federal Republic, Austria, Italy, the Nordic Countries (especially Finland), and Greece from 1989 onwards. Other favourite destinations among CEE migrants included non-European countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and - to a lesser extent - Israel and Turkey. The direction of these migratory movements is hardly surprising. East-West migration has a long history. The present movements are not new phenomena but represent the re-emergence of the flows after a period of artificially reduced migration due to restrictive emigration policies. The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new era in a longstanding pattern of migration.¹⁷

Modern East-West migration dates back approximately 150 years and can be subdivided into three periods: 1850-1939, 1945-1989, and after 1989.¹⁸ Between 1850 and 1939 - the traditional period of large-scale emigration from the continent to overseas destinations – two factors stimulated emigration from the CEECs. First, the failure of economic expansion to keep pace with the rapid demographic growth imposed a severe burden on agricultural land and motivated people from a peasant background to emigrate. In addition to these economic difficulties, the deterioration of living conditions among people belonging to ethnic or religious minorities as a result of the rise of violent nationalism in Eastern Europe led these groups to emigrate as well. These economic, political, ethnic, and religious factors caused substantial numbers to leave for the mining and industrial areas of the United States and the agricultural regions of Canada, South America, Australia, and New Zealand. These traditional overseas immigration countries were not, however, the only destinations of East-West migration. Increasingly, the emerging coal and steel centres of Belgium, England, France, and Germany, as well as the expanding metropolises throughout Western Europe, received immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe (especially Poles) during the nineteenth century.

The Cold War period (1945-1989) began with large migration flows on the continent prompted by the aftermath of World War II. This concerned in the first place a West-East movement of about 4.7 million displaced persons and POWs (see Table 1 on p. 18) who were repatriated from Germany to the CEECs. Not all CEE citizens present in Western Europe returned. Most of the Polish armed forces in Western Europe, for example, chose to settle in Western Europe. Likewise, CEE citizens who had immigrated to Western Europe before the war often remained. During the post-war period 15.4 million people (a rough estimate based on the most important flows, see Table 1) were forced to move from East to West or between CEECs. The displacements caused by the fighting during the war and the subsequent political changes and large-scale shifts in boundaries forced Germans and ethnic minorities to "return to their native countries".

17. H. Fassmann and R. Münz (1994a, 1994b and 1995) demonstrate that migration after the 1989 events followed the same traditional pattern as during earlier periods, such as the end of the nineteenth century and the Cold War. They argue that present East-West movements are not an entirely new phenomenon but represent a new phase in the history of East-West migration.

18. For an overview of the history of East-West migration see e.g.: S. Arditis (1994); H. Fassmann & R. Münz, (1994a, 1994b and 1995); and T. Freika (1996).

Table 1. East-West, East-East and West-East Migration 1945-1950 (estimated).

Country of Origin	Destination Country	Number
Poland (including former German territories)	East and West Germany (mainly)	7,000,000
Former Czechoslovakia	East and West Germany, Austria	3,200,000
Parts of former Soviet Union (now Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Baltic states)	East and West Germany (mainly)	1,500,000
Former Yugoslavia (now Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia)	East and West Germany, Austria	360,000
Hungary	East and West Germany, Austria	225,000
Parts of former Yugoslavia (now Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia)	Italy	200,000
Parts of former Soviet Union (now Russia)	Finland	400,000
Slovakia, Rumania, former Yugoslavia	Hungary	315,000
Hungary	Slovakia	73,000
Parts of former Soviet Union (now Byelorussia, Lithuania, Ukraine)	Poland	1,496,000
Poland	Parts of former Soviet Union (now Byelorussia, Lithuania, Ukraine)	518,000
Former Czechoslovakia	Part of former Soviet Union (now Ukraine)	50,000
Parts of former Soviet Union (now Ukraine)	Former Czechoslovakia	42,000
Germany, Austria (displaced persons, Prisoners of War)	Poland, former Czechoslovakia	4,700,000
Total		20,100,000

Source: H. Fassmann & R. Münz, "European East-West Migration 1945-1992" *International Migration Review* 28 (3), 1994: 522.

The start of the Cold War entailed a rift in the emigration patterns, since international travel was abolished. Emigration initiatives, whether legal or illegal, were further discouraged by a series of administrative actions, such as severe penalties for illegal departure, seizure of property, and the prospect that emigrants would be unable to return as tourists or maintain contact with their families and friends (often subject to harassment, interrogation, and general suspicion).¹⁹ Nevertheless, although East-West migration was reduced by the Iron Curtain, it remained considerable. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania collectively lost 5 percent of their population through emigration (V. Gre¹i^o, 1993: 139).

Three factors underlay this trend. First, emigration occurred during and just after the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian uprising in 1968 and after the suppression of the 1981 solidarity-led social and political movement in Poland. Second, legal emigration during the Cold War was possible only in the context of ethnic, religious, and family migration (see Table 2, p.). As a result, ethnic migration accounted for the bulk of the East-West migration in this period, although many of those concerned acted chiefly for economic and political reasons. Ethnic and religious migration received strong support either from a Western nation or from a well-organized lobby, as with Jewish and ethnic German emigration. This backing was the third factor enabling limited East-West migration during the Cold War. From 1970 onwards, Western states, as part of their policies towards Eastern Europe, started to pressure these countries to ease their travel restrictions. The U.S. Congress, for instance, made the removal of trade barriers contingent upon this issue. These efforts facilitated emigration to the West somewhat during the deteriorating economic circumstances that motivated people to leave (K. Manfrass, 1992).

Table 2. The Main Flows of Central and East European Ethnic and Political Emigration 1950-1993

19. This situation was not consistent throughout all countries of the former East Block. Czechoslovakia, for example, was one of the most isolated and had tighter emigration restrictions than neighbouring countries such as Poland and Hungary, which allowed limited movement. The former Yugoslavia was exceptional in the practice of restricting international travel, since it was the only East European country allowing labour emigration during the 1960s.

(estimates in some cases)

Country of Origin	Destination	Number	Period	Type of Migration
GDR	FRG	5,275,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Übersiedler)
Poland	FRG	1,430,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
USSR/CIS	FRG	746,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
Romania	FRG	402,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
Czechoslovakia	FRG	105,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
Yugoslavia	FRG	90,000	1950-1992	ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
Bulgaria	Turkey	630,000	1950-1992	ethnic Turks and Slavic Muslims
Yugoslavia	Turkey	300,000	1950-1966	ethnic Turks and Slavic Muslims
USSR/CIS	Israel, USA	750,000	1950-1992	Jews
USSR/CIS	Greece, France, USA	170,000	1950-1992	Armenians, ethnic Greeks, Pentecostals
Romania	Israel, USA	500,000	1960-1992	Jews
Romania	Western Europe (mainly FRG)	240,000	1991-1993	mainly gypsies
Yugoslavia, Romania	Hungary	124,000	1988-1993	mainly ethnic Hungarians
Yugoslavia	FRG	355,000	1991-1993	political refugees (sudden wave)
Yugoslavia	Other Western Europe	330,000	1991-1993	political refugees (sudden wave)
Poland	FRG, Austria and others	250,000	1980-1981	political refugees (sudden wave)
Hungary	Austria, USA, UK, Yugoslavia, Canada	194,000	1956	political refugees (sudden wave)
Czechoslovakia	FRG, Austria, USA, Canada, Australia	162,000	1968-1969	political refugees (sudden Wave)
Total		12,053,000		

Source: H. Fassmann & R. Münz, "European East-West Migration 1945-1992", in: R. Cohen, *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, 1995: 473.

After the events of 1989, which marked the beginning of the third period in the history of East-West migration, the flows comprised two types of migration. The first type was either for ethnic or family reasons or represented displacements by refugees (see Table 2). In the early 1990s ethnic Germans migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, ethnically Turkish Bulgarians to Turkey, ethnically Greek Hungarians to Greece, and Jews to Israel and the United States. Other East-West migration resulted from the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the mistreatment of Gypsies in Romania. Much of this migration was permanent, as whole families moved to countries which offered them refugee status or with which they had ethnic, family, or religious ties. This process was usually heavily sponsored and supported by the recipient country. By now, this kind of migration has passed its peak and is rapidly falling. Most ethnic minority groups have already moved, the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia has ceased, and the governments of receiving countries have lost their enthusiasm for the issue and are now rejecting migrants they would have accepted a few years ago. This brings us to the second type of emigration: labour migration. Lately East-West migration has been increasingly driven by economic concerns. These emigrants, who are predominantly young single males,²⁰ usually find work in the industrial, construction, and service sectors and in unskilled jobs rather than in skilled and technical positions.²¹ Nevertheless, most

20. Two thirds of the Central and East European emigrants are male and about one third female. Most are young and in the productive employment age; about 75 percent is younger than 40 and 40 percent younger than 24 (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997:).

21. This profile of present CEE emigrants draws heavily upon the recent studies of H. Fassmann (1997) and H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann (1997). Both studies offer an interesting and detailed profile of Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Slovak emigrants and are also representative of the other Central and East European countries. Other literature used in this context, in particular the IOM reports, shows that the emigrant profile presented by Fassmann and Hintermann is similar

migrants are well trained and educated, and many speak a foreign language.²² The Polish case also reveals that students account for a significant share of the emigrants. These migratory movements did not emerge recently, as Polish students have been oriented towards the West since the early 1980s.

In sum, present East-West movements are not new but have entered a new phase in approximately 150 years of modern East-West migration history. After decades of isolation, the migration patterns that had been traditional during earlier periods (e.g. during the late nineteenth century and before the Cold War) resumed. The main question with respect to the introduction of the right of freedom of movement for workers is whether the migratory movements resulting from the recent political changes have peaked or are still rising. As shown in Section 1.3, one of the reasons why the introduction of free movement did not lead to large-scale migration was that it occurred after the flows had peaked. The first step in anticipating the effect of the introduction of free movement on East-West migration is therefore to analyse the potential of the flows.

2.2 East-West Migration: an emerging development, or have the flows already peaked?

The opening of national borders and the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 have not yet resulted in large migratory movements to Western Europe. Whereas emigration grew rather rapidly after 1989, the flows toward Western Europe - though far from negligible - declined significantly in the early 1990s and seem to have passed their peak (notwithstanding an increase in temporary labour migration). In other words: "New East-West emigration has undoubtedly evolved though on nothing like the scale of the worst scenarios of mass migration envisaged by some contemporary commentators, and so far the alarming forecast of mass permanent migration of 1991 have not been transformed into reality."²³ In fact, immigration from CEECs is rather low compared with the influx from other origins. In 1994, the number of Central and East Europeans in the Federal Republic of Germany was only 10 percent of the total foreign population (E. Hönekopp, 1996:100).

In light of the future accession of the CEECs and the introduction of free movement, we need to examine both the decline in East-West migration and the reasons *why* East-West migration did not emerge on a larger scale. Restrictive administrative policies have inhibited the growth of recent East-West migratory movements. In recent years, governments in Western Europe have been less supportive and more critical of East-West flows, manifesting a complete about-face with respect to their position during the Cold War. This about-face has led to restrictions on CEE immigration, thereby reducing the flow of migrants. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only West European state accepting labour immigration via bilateral treaties until 1997. Present East-West migration trends are therefore less an indication of the potential migration from the CEECs and the demand in the EU labour markets than a reflection of Western Europe's current restrictive immigration policies.

Moreover, free movement of workers relates to labour mobility. Instead of simply referring to "the flows", we should distinguish the types of migration and identify the ones that are past their peak. East-West migration is often perceived as long-term or permanent migration, since the early flows were predominantly permanent migration for family and ethnic reasons and are the types that have been declining recently.²⁴ Several migration statistics, especially the Central and East European ones, are based on this definition, as short-term migratory movements were not considered genuine emigration in Central

to the ones for the other East European countries.

22. The effect of the brain drain is worst in Hungary and the Slovak Republic and has had less of an impact on Poland and the Czech Republic. It remains unclear, however, whether the brain drain has peaked in any of these countries (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997:). For further information about the impact of the brain drain on East-West migration, see A.M. Findlay (1993 and 1995).

23. J. Salt & J.A. Clarke, 1996: 513.

24. During the Cold War emigration from CEECs was permanent. Those who departed did so for life. Therefore, emigration often continues to be seen as permanent, while short-term movement for employment purposes is defined as a special category. See in particular: J. Salt & J.A. Clarke (1996); C. Wallace & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko (1996); C. Wallace & A. Palyanitsya (1995); Z. Pavlik & J. Maresova (1994) and P. Korcelli (1994).

and Eastern Europe.²⁵ For the introduction of free movement of workers, however, the duration of the emigration is not an issue, because this EU legislation covers all types of labour migrants (both short term and permanent), provided the person in question takes up paid employment. Permanent emigration is only one of the types of migratory movements addressed by free movement. The decline in "the flows" need not prevent the introduction of free movement from giving rise to massive migration. The OECD has indicated that: "temporal migration for seasonal, cross-border, contract or individual based employment is developing".²⁶ Similarly, Fassmann and Hintermann (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 18, 19, 28) argue that most migrants have no desire to settle in the destination countries and opt for short-term labour migration, as can also be inferred from Table 3 on p. ?. East-West migration is changing and may give rise to new forms of migration. At present, the impact of short-term labour migration within the East-West migration pattern is difficult to predict but may become significant under the conditions of free movement and should not be underestimated.

Contrary to earlier instances of the introduction of the free movement of workers (see Section 1.3), we cannot state that East-West migration flows have already peaked if free movement were to be introduced at present. Furthermore, trends in East-West migration seem more indicative of present restrictive immigration policies of EU member states towards CEE immigrants than of the flows' potential. Under the free movement of workers regime these policies will have to be abolished, thus granting CEE immigrants free access to the EU labour markets. Estimating the consequences of this change requires assessing the restrictive impact of the present policies on migration processes from Eastern to Western Europe. More precisely, what is the emigration potential in Central and Eastern Europe, and to what degree do the economic, social, and labour market situations stimulate the process? As for the push factors, question remains as to whether the potential Central and East European emigrants find sufficient opportunities for immigration in Western Europe. The analysis of the factors causing East-West migration should be followed by an examination of the presence and growth of intermediary structures which support the migration processes (see Section 1.2). Finally the EU may not be the target area for CEE emigrants. Perhaps immigration opportunities exist in countries outside the EU framework.

2.3 The emigration potential of Central and Eastern Europe

The main difficulty in estimating the migration potential of a sending country without exaggerating or underestimating the dimensions of expected flows lies in choosing data that substantiate estimates. Official migration statistics may underestimate the size of migratory movements once free movement of workers has been established, because they are usually based on definitions other than free movement. As argued above, the flows are also hampered by restrictive policies towards CEE immigration, and the data are therefore less indicative of the flows' potential than of the restrictive immigration policies. Even though the Federal Republic of Germany was the only West European state allowing labour immigration via bilateral treaties until 1997, the administrative quotas restricting immigration to this country preclude using the German immigration data to estimate the effect of the introduction of free movement upon East-West flows.

Nor do the unemployment figures of the sending countries offer a valid instrument for estimating the migration potential. Historical case studies show that migration from Italy to the Federal Republic of Germany was determined more by German labour demand and unemployment figures than by the labour market situation in Italy (R. Feithen, 1986). Furthermore, the estimates of about 1.5 to 1.6 million potential Spanish and Portuguese emigrants based on unemployment figures (T. Straubhaar, 1984) did not translate into commensurate migration flows after the accession of these countries to the EC and the end of the transition period for the free movement of workers. Even though both countries remain areas of high unemployment in the EU, no massive migration has occurred.

Nor does unemployment seem to be the most important reason for East-West emigration, although

25. See e.g. the studies of: Z. Pavlik & J. Maresova (1994) and P. Korcelli (1994).

26. OECD Sopemi, 1997: 50.

considerable differences exist between countries due to discrepancies in economic growth and development. In the Slovak Republic, for instance, the unemployed are the largest group of potential migrants, whereas their share is significantly less in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 24,25, 27). Both the level of education and the nature of former employment of the Central and East European migrants indicate perfectly that international migration is selective. The economically successful receive preference in the receiving countries, and those considering the option and actually migrating are usually not the poorest in their countries. Indeed, most migrants belong to middle income groups. Persons with lower incomes may wish to migrate but often lack financial means to cover the cost (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 27). Given that unemployment is not a major reason for emigration, and that most emigrants were employed prior to leaving their country, the unemployment figures of the sending countries alone do not offer sufficient information to estimate the migration potential of Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 3: Emigration potential of CSFR, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia in 1991

	CSFR	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Russia	Total
Number of respondents	996	1000	509	953	811	4,269
Length of time (percentages*)						
some months	65	77	48	78	65	68
1-2 years	37	40	21	53	34	38
5-10 years	14	15	7	19	15	14
Forever	5	8	2	13	5	7
Population (in millions)	15.70	10.56	3.71	37.78	148.31	

* Percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

Source: R.J. Brym, "The emigration Potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia: recent Survey Results", *International Sociology*, 7, (1992): 390.

The number of persons willing to emigrate and their motivations and options might be more indicative of the potential of future flows. R.J. Brym (1992) based his estimates of the emigration potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia on the numbers of citizens of these countries that wanted to migrate to the West.²⁷ As Table 3 shows, Brym's estimates are quite high, especially when the percentages of those willing to emigrate are related to the total population of the emigration country. Relating the 5 percent of the Russian respondents interested in emigrating to the Russian population of 148.3 million in 1991 yields 6.8 million potential Russian emigrants (R.J. Brym, 1992: 389). These figures overestimate the actual situation, however, as they indicate only the desire to leave. Although the overall number of people wishing to migrate is very high, this ambition often remains unrealized. People tend to underestimate the preparation for the actual migration and the high material and psychological costs involved. Moreover, restrictive migration policies tend to curtail possible migratory movements. To obtain a more accurate estimate of the number of potential migrants, H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann (1997) considered both the wish to migrate and the actual steps taken by the future migrants in this direction. Next, they identified three different categories within the group of people wishing to migrate (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 14).

The first category (the general migration potential) consists of people who state their desire to migrate but take no further steps. The authors estimate this group at about 10 million people. The second group (approximately four million people) comprises those sharing a probable potential to migrate (i.e. those who have obtained information about the destination country). Finally "the actual migration potential" includes people who have applied for a residence or work permit and have begun to seek employment and accommodations (see Table 4).

27. The estimates exclude persons of "groups of sponsored emigrants" such as ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic of Germany or CEE Jews moving to Israel, since these persons have strong ties with the West (R.J. Brym, 1992: 389).

Table 4. General, probable and "actual" migration potential in Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics

	General Migration Potential		Probable Migration Potential		"Actual" Migration Potential	
	total	percentage*	total	percentage*	total	percentage*
Czech Republic	1,673,176	20.1	968,769	11.6	172,337	2.07
Slovak Republic	1,251,456	30.3	729,599	17.7	85,099	2.06
Poland	4,923,244	16.6	1,634,517	5.5	393,859	1.33
Hungary	1,717,039	20.5	731,459	8.7	60,096	0.72
Total	9,564,915		4,064,398		711,391	

* percentage of total population over age 14

Source: H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, *Migrationspotential Ostmitteleuropa. Struktur und Motivation potentieller Migranten aus Polen, der Slowakei, Tschechien und Ungarn*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997: 14.

Examining the proportion of persons taking actual steps towards emigration narrows down the general potential of 10 million to a more reasonable 4 million. In the present situation, in which restrictive migration policies curtail migration flows, Fassmann estimates the true potential at about 700,000, which is the number of persons who have applied for permission to immigrate (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 14). Yet, the introduction of freedom of movement for workers will eliminate this obstacle. Under these circumstances, the emigration potential is probably between the numbers in groups 2 and 3 (i.e. above the figure of 700,000 persons). Tables 3 and 4 both depict the situation at a certain point in time. The most important question from the perspective of the introduction of free movement is whether all these people will realize their aim and actually emigrate to Western Europe.

2.4 Motives for emigration from CEECs

The right of freedom of movement for workers relates to migration for employment purposes. Two hypotheses summarize the motive underlying these kinds of migratory movements. The first (the employment vacancy hypothesis) perceives the unemployment levels in the sending countries as the main incentive toward emigration, while the second hypothesis (the income differentials hypothesis) concentrates on the differences in income levels between the sending and the receiving areas. Analysing these two push factors in the migration process to determine their role in present migration flows is important for examining current and estimating future East-West migratory movements.

In general terms²⁸ CEE labour markets are affected by the painful transition from a centralized economy to a market economy. This process has devastated traditional industries, thereby giving rise to massive unemployment and declining employment rates on the one hand and the need for new kinds of employment on the other. Most CEE countries (except for the Czech Republic) face high long-term unemployment and a low turnover in unemployment. On the one hand, despite large employment losses in state enterprises and agriculture, the flows into unemployment have not reached the levels they might have. A major share of the unemployed actually leaves the labour force instead of being re-employed. The reduction of the actual labour supply results from early retirement by elderly workers, women leaving paid employment to become housewives, and workers disappearing into the grey section of the labour market or working abroad (legally or illegally). On the other hand, unemployment in the CEE has rapidly increased because very few of the unemployed are re-employed. The pattern extends the duration of unemployment, which in turn reduces the capacity of the job-seekers to find new employment (T. Boeri, 1994b). Moreover,

28. Detailed analysis of CEE labour markets is rather difficult for lack of good labour market data due to differences in methodological frameworks used in the CEECs (European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 70). Moreover, official statistics often underestimate unemployment rates and the duration of unemployment in CEE (T. Boeri, 1994a: 15-16).

unemployment is not evenly distributed between the economic sectors and regions or among different groups of workers.

Instead, unemployment rates and the duration of unemployment among different groups of workers depend on their position on the labour market and their possibilities for finding new employment. Especially women, youngsters, and unskilled workers are seriously affected by the risk of long-term employment (T. Boeri, 1994a: 16-19). State firms and traditional industries often reduced their labour force, either through early retirement plans and hiring freezes (which eliminated employment opportunities for new entrances on the labour market) or by cutting administrative posts generally filled by women (thereby decreasing female employment) rather than male-dominated jobs on the production lines. Women are liable to long-term unemployment, because employers and governments in CEE see men as the wage-earners for the family and often grant them preference in available employment, while expecting women to be responsible for household and family duties (J. Heinen, 1994). Unskilled workers are the largest group among the unemployed, because vocational training in CEE does not always keep up with the rapid changes in the skills demanded of labour. Consequently, youngsters and the long-term unemployed may be unqualified for new kinds of employment generated in areas such as the service sector of the economy. As poorly skilled young people are affected the most by unemployment, this group's rate of unemployment is high in most CEEs. Long-term unemployment is pushing many unemployed out of registered employment into the black economy (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 70, 71) or encouraging them to seek employment abroad.

The sectoral distribution of employment in CEE has changed significantly during the transition period. Declining employment in the industrial and agricultural sectors has coincided with job growth in service-related employment. Dwindling employment in agriculture has led to high unemployment rates in this economic sector. Nevertheless, agricultural employment in Poland and Romania increased in some cases because the agricultural sector absorbed surplus labour from other economic sectors. Privatization of land ownership has rapidly increased the number of private firms and has stimulated the move of labour into agriculture. Small agricultural holdings are perceived as protection from possible unemployment in the future. This high rate of employment in agriculture in Poland, however, is temporary. If the economic reforms continue, smaller agricultural holdings will amalgamate into large concerns, leading to a decrease in the demand for labour from this sector (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 53, 62). Total industrial employment has plummeted, both because of changes in production patterns and because of the downturn in the formerly important heavy industries. The situation is similar in the construction sector, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic. Unemployment will probably continue to rise in these sectors, as certain areas (e.g. Upper Silesia in Poland, which has a large concentration of heavy industries) have not yet restructured their industries. Delays in industrial reconstruction are often motivated by the political concern that an increase in unemployment would severely tax a country's social security system (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 54, 61, 62). Such workers are often unskilled and have difficulty finding new employment in other sectors. In most cases, loss of employment means weighing the prospect of long-term unemployment against emigration. The high emigration potential in these sectors is therefore understandable (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 24-25). Contrary to industry and agriculture, the service sector is thriving in most Central and East European Countries. From being underdeveloped, this sector has evolved rapidly (especially in finance, tourism, and trade) to the levels necessary for an efficient market economy. The service sector has also expanded in less advanced countries, such as Romania. Overall, however, the increase in employment in this sector has not completely offset the decrease in the other sectors. On the whole, unemployment levels have risen (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 54).

Like the sectoral breakdown of unemployment, regional discrepancies in unemployment have been apparent in CEE from the beginning of the transition. In most CEEs regional unemployment coexists with labour shortages elsewhere. On the one hand, the number of job seekers is growing in areas offering few employment opportunities. A large component of the labour force in CEE was employed in agriculture. The marked decline in employment in this sector of the economy has left the underdeveloped agricultural areas of Poland (Northern and North-western regions), Hungary (Eastern regions), Estonia, and Slovenia with high unemployment rates (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 53, 62). Similarly, many industrial areas experiencing severe job losses rely on one or two industries with few new employment

opportunities (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 54, 61, 62). Contrary to the agricultural and heavy industry areas, urban areas are experiencing a rise in the labour market demand. In certain areas of the Czech Republic about ten unemployed apply for each position, while in Prague there are two vacancies per job seeker (T. Boeri & S. Scarpetta, 1995: 4).

The unbalanced regional distribution of job seekers and vacancies, which is serious by western standards (T. Boeri, 1994: 19-20), has not diminished significantly in recent years. The decrease in regional labour mobility is one of the underlying factors. The current regional disparities make the geographical mobility of labour from declining to expanding areas predictable. Nevertheless, inter-regional migration (even towards cities such as Prague) has decreased. One possible reason is that the regional reallocation of workers within the CEE is often hindered by the housing shortage in urban centres or social factors such as family ties. Furthermore, commuting between work and place of residence (which was not unusual during the communist period) appears to have increased (T. Boeri & S. Scarpetta, 1995: 26-28). Finally international emigration offers an alternative to those forced to leave their home to find new employment. Therefore, regardless of the level of unemployment in some CEE regions, vacancies in other regions may be filled by immigrant labour (see Part IV).

Aside from regional differences in employment situations, unemployment levels vary considerably between countries depending on their respective phase of economic transition. In the countries that have advanced further in this process (i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), the loss of employment in the state sector has been offset to a limited degree by an expansion of the private sector. In Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic employment prospects are bleaker. Dramatic decline in the state sector combined with modest growth in the private sector has driven up unemployment. Romania's employment situation is among the worst. The country has maintained employment at the risk of hyperinflation and has left much restructuring for the future, with imminent high unemployment (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 55, 56, 62-70 and O. Blanchard & S. Commander & F. Corcelli, 1994: 69, 70).

In sum, in most CEECs (with the exception of Romania, where unemployment continues to rise) unemployment peaked in 1994. Nevertheless, unemployment rates remain very high, with no immediate reduction in sight. Much unemployment lies in store because of the delayed closure of large state enterprises. Nor are there any indications of a significant increase in employment any CEECs. Even if a job expansion occurs, the new employment opportunities in the service sector may require skills that the unemployed do not have. A possible decrease in the age of the working population due to the demographic profile of the CEECs and retirement schemes will not necessarily diminish the overall labour supply.²⁹ In Poland, for example, the number of young workers entering the labour market increased during the second half of this decade. Since this process renders a decline in unemployment rates unlikely following the transition to a new economic system (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 70, 71), unemployment remains a stimulus for emigration from this country.

Nonetheless, the significance of unemployment rates as in the case of East-West migration should not be overestimated. Most migrants and potential migrants were employed prior to their move. Issues such as better working conditions, career changes, and continuing education seem to be more important in the decision to emigrate (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997). The higher wages in Western Europe are the main incentive for present East-West movements. Migrants are usually well informed about wage levels in Europe, are aware of the difficulties in finding employment, and understand that they are likely to be employed below their current professional level. Nonetheless, the advantages of increases in income available through emigration are decisive and often lead people to move. Such emigration, however, is not always long term. Short-term migration is perceived as "a strategy not to leave".³⁰ In most cases emigrants do not want to leave their country but hope to improve their immediate living conditions and use the higher

29. Demographic data for CEECs (e.g. fertility, mortality, and age composition) resemble those of economically advanced countries. In recent years the population of most CEECs has been declining. Only in Poland and Slovakia have there been natural increases. In most cases, however, the decline in population is attributable to rising death rates. Birth rates remain higher than those in the EU and indicate the number of future workers. Nevertheless, Central and Eastern Europe are not experiencing structural population growth, which was one of the main causes for the high unemployment rates of many Mediterranean countries during the 1960s (European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 37-39).

30. M. Morokvasic, "Une migration pendulaire: des Polonais en Allemagne", quoted in A. Fischer, 1994: 158.

West European wages to finance their everyday life (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 19). The high number of married people considering emigration and intending to migrate individually rather than as a couple or family³¹ indicates that working abroad is a strategy to increase the family income and to minimize the risk that several family members will become unemployed at the same time (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 19). Similarly, several Polish villages depend upon necessary income supplements via short-term circular emigration. Part of the village's population migrates to Germany for employment reasons and returns home after some months. During their absence, those remaining behind perform some of their tasks (A. Fischer, 1994: 158).

As stated, the higher wages in Western Europe are the main driving force behind present East-West movement. With the exception of Hungary, the beginning of the economic transition coincided with a growing difference between absolute and real wages due mainly to inflation resulting from price deregulation. While real wages dropped sharply, absolute wages were equal to and sometimes even higher than the pre-transitional level (O. Blanchard & S. Commander & F. Corcelli, 1994: 63). At present, income differences between CEEs and several West European countries are considerable. Recent estimates suggest, for example, that CEE wages will take about 35 years to match those in Germany (F. Franzmeyer & H. Brücker, 1997: 4).

Still, these wage differentials should not be overstated. First, they are rarely adjusted for inflation (despite the key role of inflation in the reduction of real wages). As shown above, most potential migrants seek to improve the immediate living conditions and generally use the higher West-European wages to finance everyday life. Estimates of the effect of income on future migration flows should therefore factor in the outlook for general economic growth, especially inflation. Second, migration usually occurs when the income is at socially unacceptable levels. To reduce migration pressure, wage levels in the sending country need not necessarily match those of the receiving area. Finally, the significant emotional and financial costs rarely receive adequate consideration. Migration policies are not the only hindrances to international migration. Difficulties in preparing migration, links with the country of origin, and the cost of migration will continue to withhold a considerable number of potential emigrants from moving, even if restrictive immigration policies are abolished.

On the other hand, immigrant networks and geographic distance may reduce the importance of these aspects (P.A. Fischer & T. Straubhaar, 1996). Section 2.5 of this paper will demonstrate their impact on present East-West flows. Furthermore, the economic and labour market situation in most CEEs (even the most prosperous ones) is unlikely to improve in the near future (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 70, 71). The bleak prospects are manifested by the readiness of people to move. Large groups have already emigrated and are more likely to do so again, considering they have past experience in this area (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 28-29). Despite the drop in the official emigration and immigration figures, emigration potential should not be underestimated in light of the high number of potential emigrants and their readiness to move. Still, economic push factors and the willingness to emigrate will be realized only if sufficient employment opportunities exist for these people in receiving countries. An analysis is necessary of the labour market situation of the destination countries preferred by CEE emigrants to estimate the potential of East-West migration once free movement of workers is introduced for the applying CEEs

2.5 Preferred destination countries among Central and East European migrants

As shown in Section 1.2 of this study, migrants prefer certain destinations to others for several reasons. Political stability, economic circumstances, and labour market conditions are important in the decision-making process of migrants, as well as issues such as the presence of an immigrant population in the

31. About 48 percent of the emigrants is single, 41 percent married, and the remaining 9.8 percent either divorced or widowed. Nevertheless, despite the share of married emigrants, East-West migration is still made up of individual people instead of families, because half the married people plan to move individually (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 19).

recipient country and the geographic and cultural distance between areas. The EU member states or third countries preferred by CEE emigrants as destinations are important with respect to present East-West migration and the enlargement question. Four categories of considerations underlie the choice of immigration country: administrative policies, labour market conditions, immigrant populations and networks, and geographic and cultural distances.

The effects of immigration policies in the immigration countries on migratory movements range from impeding the flows through restrictive legislation to supporting the process via bilateral labour treaties (see Section 1.2). During the Cold War, Western states maintained an open door policy towards CEE and put considerable diplomatic pressure on the East Block to reduce travel restrictions. Although the West welcomed CEE citizens as refugees (regardless of their motives for migration) the Cold War policies of the respective countries differed considerably in scope and implementation. The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Israel maintained more encouraging foreign policies toward immigration from Central and East European citizens than France and the United Kingdom (K. Manfrass, 1992). These countries concentrated on their colonial and former dependent areas and consequently received large numbers of immigrants from Algeria and the Commonwealth. Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, strongly backed ethnic and religious emigration from CEECs. The United States even made the abolition of travel restrictions in CEE a condition for the removal of trade barriers. As a result, emigration to these countries became somewhat easier and migratory movements emerged, albeit on a rather modest scale. More importantly, these administrative actions gave the impression in the CEECs that these Western countries welcomed immigrants. This encouragement combined with the economic conditions and high standards of living in the West conveyed an image of the Promised Land for future immigrants. Understandably, therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are preferred destinations among CEE migrants. France and the United Kingdom, though traditional destination countries for CEE emigrants in the past, did not experience a significant increase in the migratory movements after the events of 1989.

Following the political changes of 1989, the recipient countries lost enthusiasm for their role. The end of the Cold War meant that CEE emigration became less important in their foreign policies. Moreover, the liberalization of travel restrictions in CEE has enabled a rise in East-West migration that is considered unacceptable for Western states. These countries are now rejecting migrants they would have accepted a few years before and are reducing the flow of migrants through their restrictive actions. The Federal Republic of Germany was the exception here. It was the only West European country that actively encouraged immigration until 1997, via the signature of bilateral labour treaties with CEECs. Through these treaties the Federal administration intended on the one hand to improve economic cooperation with CEECs and on the other to support labour market developments in both the sending CEECs and domestically. Under the rotation principle these treaties authorized labour immigration to limited numbers of migrants for limited periods (A. Fischer, 1994: 152). In practice, however, CEE citizens filled gaps on the German labour market. Employment in Germany was contingent upon demand and possible only after examining whether any German or EC workers were available (A. Fischer, 1994: 157). Nevertheless, the system lured potential emigrants from the CEECs and provided opportunities for a growing number of immigrants. Migration flows to the Federal Republic of Germany were thus larger than to other West-European countries.

Regarding the second category (labour market conditions and economic circumstances), we see that labour migration has recently started to dominate East-West movements. The underlying motives for emigration today are essentially pull factors in the West, such as higher wages, better employment conditions, career opportunities, and education. Push factors, such as unemployment and the political situation in the sending area, seem to be of secondary importance (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 40-42). CEE emigrants, who are usually very well informed about West-European labour market conditions and know about wage levels in Europe, therefore prefer high wage countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. Nevertheless, while economic motivations might be important in the decision to emigrate, they are not the main reason behind the choice of a destination country. Table 5 reveals the importance of geographic distance and immigrant networks in the choice of the immigration country, while economic stability, and especially specific labour market conditions, seem to be less important.

Table 5. Motives in choosing a destination country (percentages)

	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic	Poland	Hungary	Total
Geographic distance	60.5	47.6	39.6	38.8	47.7
Stable country*	48.6	55.0	37.3	29.0	44.7
Immigrant population:	44.5:	46.1:	52.4:	26.8:	43.3:
Presence of friends	32.2	27.0	31.4	17.2	27.4
Presence of family	12.3	19.1	21.0	9.6	15.9
Labour market	27.6	35.9	37.0	18.2	30.6
Ease in obtaining a Residence permit	13.5	9.9	6.8	6.6	9.6

* political and economic stability.

Source: H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, *Migrationspotential Ostmitteleuropa. Struktur und Motivation potentieller Migranten aus Polen, der Slowakei, Tschechien und Ungarn*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997: 38.

The third category (the presence of an immigrant population in receiving areas) is one of the strongest intermediary structures in the migration process (see Section 1.2). As Boyd (1989) has demonstrated, friends and family of potential migrants function as a bridge between sending and receiving areas by providing new arrivals with information, financial and practical support (e.g. in obtaining housing), and assistance in finding employment. The long history of East-West migration has given rise to a large diaspora of CEE migrants in several West European countries such as Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as overseas in North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand. Contacts between the immigrants abroad and their CEE home countries during the Cold War are also relevant to present East-West migration. Was communication possible, or did all contacts end due to restrictive policies?

Contacts between the diaspora and the home countries were difficult but not impossible and varied considerably depending on the CEEc. The former Czechoslovakia, for example, was one of the most isolated CEEcs compared with Poland and Hungary. Communication opportunities usually reflected ideological principles and the state of international relations and were therefore more abundant in some years than in others. Many CEE immigrants in the West retained strong emotional ties with their home country and wished to keep in contact, especially because of the Cold War political and military situation and the Soviet repression of the 1956 and 1968 uprisings. In addition, the period between the start of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall was too brief for a complete break between the emigrants and their family, acquaintances, and friends back home. Travel restrictions were already loosening throughout the 1980s, and the 35 to 40-year separation was about half a lifetime. Besides, during the Cold War East-West migration continued on a limited scale and followed the direction of earlier flows (see Section 2.1),³² thereby increasing the immigrant populations abroad.

The traditional migration flows and the established diaspora in the West set a precedent for the new migration movements after 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall preceded a major increase in East-West travel for tourist and family visits on the one hand and family and ethnic migration on the other. This trend strengthened existing contacts. Official channels encouraged the process, since some CEE administrations (e.g. the Polish government) made efforts to re-establish contacts with the diaspora in Western Europe and overseas. At present, migrant networks seem very well established and provide strong links between sending and receiving areas. The highly circular nature of East-West labour migration also enables returning migrants to mediate in the migration process by providing new emigrants with necessary information and support and by sharing experiences. Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) also stress the importance of networks within East-West migration.³³ Table 5 shows that the presence of immigrants in a

32. Former Yugoslavia is the exception here. During the 1960s it was the only CEEc permitting labour migration to Western Europe. Consequently, large numbers migrated towards the West, especially to the Federal Republic of Germany.

33. Fassmann and Hintermann show, furthermore, that a small share (about 15 percent) of those who lack personal connections abroad consider emigration, while among the group with family and friends abroad about 30 percent is willing to emigrate (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 39).

receiving area is the third reason (and even the main factor in the Polish case) in the choice of a destination country after geographic distance and political stability and is more important than labour market conditions.

Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) also emphasize geographic and cultural distances (the fourth category) in East-West migration. The migrants' knowledge of foreign languages is closely related to the choice of destination, as demonstrated by the languages that are less widely spoken in Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. English and French). Since German and Russian are the most widely known foreign languages in CEE, emigrants from this area tend to head for German-speaking countries (e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 22). The conclusion drawn for the effect of linguistic affinity appears to apply for geographic proximity as well. Table 5 (p. ?) identifies this factor as the most important motive in the choice of an immigration country, thus explaining why the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria are the preferred destinations among emigrants from the four Central European countries. If this hypothesis is extended to other CEEcs, Finland becomes the destination country for migration from the Baltic states, Austria and Italy for Slovenia, and Greece for Bulgarians.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Austria are thus the preferred destination countries for emigration from CEE. This conclusion of the examination of the four factors in choosing a destination country is illustrated in Table 6 and in the migration statistics of Eurostat and the OECD (see appendices I and II). The relevant question with respect to the upcoming enlargement is whether introducing free movement of workers for the applying CEEcs will influence this preference with respect to the destination country.

First, East-West migration does not concentrate exclusively on EU member states. Both Table 6 and Appendix III show that destinations outside the EU framework (e.g. Switzerland and traditional overseas immigration countries such as the United States) are also preferred by CEE migrants, especially by Poles and Hungarians. Here, the important question is whether emigrants, after the introduction of free movement, will prefer an EU destination to the traditional ones simply because of the abolition of immigration restrictions. They could but are not very likely to do so. The EU experiences with previous introductions of free movement of workers show that in spite of the introduction, some migrants still preferred destinations outside the free movement area (see Section 1.3). In the case of present East-West migration, the ease of acquiring legal residence is unimportant in choosing a destination country (see Table 5, p. 29), while difficulties obtaining such permits do not seem to be a strong deterrent (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 44). Moreover, migrant networks with third countries remain strong factors within the migration process.

Table 6. Preferred destination countries of potential migrants (percentages)

	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic	Poland	Hungary	Total
Federal Republic	42.6	36.3	37.4	31.4	37.0
Austria	22.6	25.9	17.8	30.5	24.4
UK	9.2	7.1	4.5	3.8	6.4
France	2.0	4.1	5.4	4.3	4.1
Italy	5.8	2.6	5.1	2.3	3.9
Scandinavia	2.7	2.5	3.1	4.9	3.3
Netherlands	3.4	2.3	3.5	2.2	2.8
Total EU	89.2	80.7	76.8	79.4	81.7
Switzerland	8.3	13.0	7.7	5.7	9.1
Eastern Europe	2.5	6.3	0.5	-	2.8
Others*	-	-	15.0	14.9	6.4
Total Non-EU	10.8	19.3	23.2	20.6	18.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Mainly overseas countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Source: H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, *Migrationspotential Ostmitteleuropa. Struktur und Motivation potentieller Migranten aus Polen, der Slowakei, Tschechien und Ungarn*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997: 36.

Nonetheless, a large majority of the potential EEC emigrants wishes to move to an EU country and in particular the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. Nothing suggests that the accession of CEECs will alter this situation significantly. After the EU's East enlargement the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria will probably remain the most attractive destinations for CEE emigrants, although the impact on other EU member states should not be underestimated. Geographic proximity to other EU countries bordering the new members (e.g. Finland, Italy, and Greece) might draw emigrants as well. France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium - all countries with established immigrant networks - could become popular destinations. At present, these countries aim to limit the number of Central and East European arrivals and offer no legal employment opportunities for these migrants.³⁴ The introduction of free movement will void these restrictive policies. At this point factors such as immigrant networks and geographic distance, as well as an emerging demand for foreign workers within an EU country, would stimulate migration flows.

The importance of geographic proximity and immigrant networks in the choice of the immigration country is understandable. Theories of international migration processes demonstrate that labour migration can be seen as an investment decision, since labour migrants weigh income advantages against the risks and expenses of the move. Geographic proximity and immigrant networks can reduce the cost of emigration. While emigrants might prefer to migrate to the country offering the highest wages, they will make do with the options available to them (see Section 1.2). In the Central European countries, however, both proximity and wage factors steer migrants toward the same countries. Countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the Scandinavian nations offer the highest wages in Western Europe and are geographically closest to sending countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states. As explained in Section 2.3, during the introductions of free movement of workers at the previous enlargements of the EU, the labour sending countries did not share an extended frontier with EU immigration countries that might enable short distance and frontier migration. Historically, the introduction of free movement has been a special stimulus to these migration flows. The historical case studies also reveal that migratory movements regulated by such provisions are driven by labour demand (see Section 1.3): free movement of workers regime allows potential CEE emigrants to migrate to EU member states only if sufficient employment opportunities exist in these destination countries.

2.6 Employment opportunities in EU member states

Previous introductions of free movement have shown that migration flows under this EU provision are regulated more by trends on the demand than on the supply side of the labour market (see Section 1.3). The introduction of free movement for applying CEECs will therefore enable massive East-West migration only if sufficient employment opportunities are available for CEE citizens in West European member states. Today, unemployment exists in all member states. The large demand that prevailed in the 1960s for unskilled (i.e. immigrant) labour has not been forthcoming, and any minor job expansions in the last two decades have concerned only highly skilled and technical workers. No large numbers of migrants for the more permanent types of employment are likely in the near future. This situation is illustrated by present intra-EU movements and is often identified as one of the main reasons why East-West migration is unlikely to occur in massive numbers (H. Werner, 1995: 21). This rationale is based on the assumption that employment in the EU will not change dramatically. Future flows depend in part on growth in EU employment levels due to an economic upswing, demographic change, and participation of women in the labour market. Moreover, despite the very high level of unemployment in the EU and the insufficient

34. These restrictive policies did not always prevent illegal immigration. The actual numbers of CEE citizens in countries such as Belgium and Greece are much higher than the figures in the official immigration statistics, see e.g. J. Lemann (1997) and K. Romaniszyn (1996).

demand for permanent or long-term paid employment, vacancies exist in specific sectors of the economy. The informal side of the labour market (e.g. agriculture, construction, and the service sectors) needs short-term and often unskilled labour (OECD: Sopemi, 1997: 19). These sectors are where CEE workers find employment (A. Fischer, 1994: 156) and refute the argument that migration flows will not increase for lack of demand. On the contrary, push as well as certain pull factors seem to be driving East-West migration, and a detailed examination of the different kinds of labour migration - short or long distance migration and temporary employment - will reveal more about the likely scale of such an increase.

Short-term employment and residence (e.g. seasonal work) could increase after the introduction of free movement. There is a demand for temporary foreign workers in the EU (OECD: Sopemi, 1997: 19 and Table 2 of Appendix II), as West European economies need more flexible labour to cope with seasonal demand. Such vacancies, for which West European citizens are difficult to recruit, correspond roughly with the profile and motives of many CEE emigrants. East-West migration is very circular. Many CEE citizens stay in Western Europe only briefly – to supplement in the family budget, earn money for university tuition, or purchase expensive consumer goods - and intend to migrate again in the future (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 19). Temporary employment therefore seems to suit both ends of the migratory chain perfectly: CEE citizens improve their incomes, and West European economies obtain sufficient labour to do work for which no West European citizens are available under the social and employment conditions offered (A. Fischer, 1994: 156-158).

This trend is difficult to quantify. In many cases short-term or seasonal employment in the construction, agriculture, and service sectors of EU labour markets is covert, because regular employment of CEE citizens is precluded by the immigration restrictions in many West European countries (E. Hönekopp, 1996: 112). Following the future accession of CEE states, the abolition of immigration restrictions will enable more widespread regular short-term employment of CEE workers. Since the introduction of free movement means that CEE citizens have to be employed under the same conditions as domestic workers and will make these "cheap" workers more expensive, West European employers may respond by turning to a new source of "cheap" labour (see Section 1.1). Free movement would extend emigration opportunities but might also reduce the chances of employment for CEE citizens. The course of events will depend on the legal employment conditions offered in the West European labour markets. Since seasonal work is dominated by flexible employment contracts, and in some EU countries (e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany) no social benefit payments are required for employment lasting less than 50 days (E. Hönekopp, 1996: 102), West European employers might continue to benefit from short-term East-West labour immigration under the terms of free movement.

Other types of short-term employment, which do not necessarily entail temporary residence in the recipient country, include contract work or the services of self-employed persons. Increased labour market flexibility means that employees are being recruited for brief periods or are officially taken on as self-employed persons or contract workers, even though they perform the same work as permanent employees. German estimates indicate that 60 to 70 per cent of all CEE contract workers are actually illegal temporary workers. West European firms will sign contracts with CEE firms for the provision of cheap labour rather than the performance of tasks. These so-called contract workers, though brought in under CEE terms of employment, often have bad working conditions. The West European firm can refuse all responsibility for employees of the CEE firm. Moreover, the CEE firm, which is not subject to the strict West European employment laws, pays the wages and provides social security at its discretion (A. Fischer, 1994: 155, 161). In sum, the wage cost advantages of hiring "employees" through arrangements other than regular employment are enormous. No social security provisions or payments above minimum wage are required, and employers have fewer responsibilities and can terminate employment far more easily than under the standard employment regulations. The benefits of these labour-recruiting arrangements for employers are clear.

According to the previous experiences of the EU with the introduction of free movement, in the transition period between the Portuguese accession and the free movement of workers, Portuguese workers simply moved within the EC under the arrangements for contract workers (see Section 1.3). Likewise, citizens of several CEECs already have the right to move as self-employed persons in the EU under the

present association regime.³⁵ In other words, EU employers have adopted new kinds of employment relations, which the Central and East European citizens see as one of the few ways to move into the EU area legally. Therefore, East-West migration regulated by these legal arrangements will become or is already becoming a significant trend.

Previously in the EU, the introduction of the right of freedom of movement of workers had an impact upon cross-border migration. In this case - where workers reside in their home country while working in the receiving country and commute daily or weekly between both areas - the financial and psychological burden (i.e. the thresholds of leaving) were lower than with any other form of emigration. Understandably, within the European Communities the workers in the frontier regions were the most likely to use their free movement rights (see Section 1.3).

The EU's forthcoming enlargements will mark the first time in the history of the free movement of workers that this right will be extended to several labour sending countries along the Union's frontier. During the 1960s, when free movement within the EC was established, Italy was the Communities' labour sending country. Italy, however, shares only a small frontier with France. Upon the EC's first enlargement, only Denmark (which is not a labour sending country) shared a frontier with the Six. Among the Mediterranean accessions only Spain was located at the Communities' frontier. Here the Pyrenees strongly hindered cross-border movements (EURES, 1996: 46). None of the latest new EU member states are labour sending countries, and only Austria has a common frontier with the Twelve. Never before have the Union's enlargements involved countries with both a high emigration potential and an extended frontier with the EU - in this case from Finland to the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria to Italy and Greece. This situation combined with the importance of cross-border migration within the EU suggests that the East European accessions, contrary to earlier enlargements, will increase cross-border migration substantially.

Cross-border migration is stimulated on the one hand by the economic and labour market situation in several EU member states along the CEE frontier. As shown above, short-term and seasonal employment in construction, agriculture, and tourism is available in these member states, and West European employers prefer to recruit CEE citizens (A. Fischer, 1994: 154, 156). Moreover, the geographic situation favours cross-border migration, as large cities in some of the EU's frontier states are quite close to the Eastern frontier. Improvements in infrastructure, particularly the routes to the large cities and industrial areas in the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria, allow cross-border migration for persons who live further away from the border or seek employment deeper within the country. Although wages in the most advanced CEECs are not much lower than in the EU's poorest countries, the discrepancy is greatest along the Union's Eastern frontier; where the Union's wealthiest countries are located (C. Wallance & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996: 272). Potential migrants therefore stand to gain the most from moving to these countries. Cross-border migrants can profit from the high wages in the EU while enjoying the lower cost of living at home (although this practice might fuel price inflation in the border towns). Finally, a previous section of this study on the choice of destination countries shows that frontier countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria are the preferred destinations. Past migration flows, migrant networks, administrative policies, and cultural and language factors all point to these countries. Thus, the frontier countries will remain favoured destinations among CEE emigrant workers.

Across the Union's eastern frontier the pull factors in Western Europe interact with several push factors. Although some of these countries, like Poland and the Czech Republic, belong to the most advanced CEECs, their general economic and labour market situation is stimulating emigration (e.g. European Policies Research Centre, 1996: 70, 71). In several border regions, such as western and northern Poland, eastern Slovakia, and western Slovenia, unemployment is acute (see Appendix IV). As explained above, the supply of cross-border migrants has not diminished to residents along the frontier, since improvements in infrastructure make cross-border migration an option for persons living further inland. Moreover, the citizens of the frontier countries can already enter the Union relatively easily due to the abolition of entrance visa requirements and can explore employment opportunities on the other side of the frontier. The Federal Republic of Germany has legalized cross-border migration with Poland and the Czech Republic,

35. The EU has established association treaties (known as the European Agreements) with the following CEECs: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

under the condition that no German or EU citizen is available for the post offered (A. Fischer, 1994: 154). Cross-border migration can be highly advantageous and enables migrants to earn a higher income in the West while enjoying a lower cost of living at home. The large number of emigration candidates in the economically advanced border states Poland and the Czech Republic is therefore understandable (see Table 4, p.).

In sum, cross-border migration is significant within the EU framework, and a great many applicant countries for EU membership share an extended border with the EU Fifteen and have a large pool of potential cross-border migrants. The push and pull factors behind this migration process function on both sides of the frontier, while improvements in infrastructure and reductions in entrance restrictions concerning the citizens of several CEE frontier states are simplifying East-West cross-border migration. This kind of migration is therefore likely to increase following the accession of the CEEcs bordering the Union and the introduction of free movement of workers. On the other hand, investments in CEEcs, encouraged by the new freedom of capital movements after the accession, may create employment opportunities there and consequently reduce the incentives to emigrate. Nonetheless, such a turn of events need not lead to higher employment levels among Czechs and Poles, as the new positions could also be filled by immigrant labour present in the Czech Republic and Poland (see the IOM reports on transit migration).

2.7 Conclusion

Part II of this study has projected the guidelines of the EU's past experiences with free movement indicated in Part I on present East-West migratory movements to examine the possible effect of the introduction of free movement of workers for applying CEEcs.

The first issue that comes to the fore is that migration flows from the applying states to the EU have not necessarily already peaked, as had been the case with the previous introductions of the free movement of workers. Present East-West migration trends are more indicative of immigration restrictions and legislation of EU member states than of the potential behind the migratory process. In fact, the push and pull factors (the pull factors are especially important because intra-EC migration flows are regulated more by demand than by supply) behind the migration process affect present East-West movements and exist alongside significant numbers of potential migrants in CEE. Furthermore, East-West migration is backed by established intermediary structures linking sending with receiving areas. Abolition of the present restrictive West European policies and legislation towards CEE immigrants through the introduction of free movement will be conducive to East-West movements and the factors underlying the migratory process.

In such a scenario, future labour market trends within the EU (e.g. unemployment, demographic change, and women's participation in the labour market) will determine the impact on East-West migration of the coming enlargement and introduction of free movement. As for estimating the possible effects of free movement upon migration flows permanent, short-term, and cross-border flows need to be differentiated. Historically, the impact of free movement has proven especially strong with respect to cross-border movement and short-term migration. The present situations in the EU and in CEE suggest that the number of emigrants will increase the most in precisely these kinds of movements following the forthcoming enlargements. Even if wages among the frontier countries in CEE reach German and Austrian levels, migratory movements are likely to continue, given the regional nature of cross-border migration. In choosing their migration destination, frontier migrants consider differences in wages and the distance with respect to the nearest employment opportunity within their home country, working conditions, and employment rights. All play a significant role in their decision. As a result, cross-border migration can become permanent, and minor differences in wages will not necessarily result in a decrease in the movements.

The next question is whether the potential migrants residing in the CEE will exercise their right of freedom of movement for workers. Although a large majority of CEE migrants chooses to migrate to the EU, East-West migration is not exclusively to EU member states, as potential emigrants also go to

countries like Switzerland and overseas destinations. The main issue is whether free movement will be the principal legal arrangement regulating East-West migration within an enlarged EU. As argued above, movements under the provisions of free supply of services and freedom of establishment provide migration and employment opportunities for migrants, which employers seem to prefer over free movement.

This brings us to the final issue, which is whether West European employers are willing to recruit citizens from the CEE once free movement is introduced. In addition to entitling CEE citizens to seek and accept employment in the EU member states, the right of freedom of movement for workers grants them the same rights as national workers regarding pay and employment conditions, thereby making them less attractive to West European employers. Historical case studies show that the paradox of free movement involves legal migration opportunities that simultaneously reduce the chance of employment for its beneficiaries, as employers might search for new sources of "cheap" and flexible workers elsewhere. Under the conditions of free movement as well as in all other kinds of labour recruitment, employers have the final say about which workers (domestic, EU, or third country nationals, whether legal or illegal) they hire. The willingness and desire of employers, either as enterprises or through more private or domestic arrangements) to accept illegal aliens is one of the main reasons for the failure of immigration restrictions to prevent illegal immigration (C.-V. Marie, 1994; M. Miller, 1994 and D.S. North, 1994).

The coming enlargement and the position of CEE citizens in the West European labour markets will also be affected by the trend of trade and industry in Western Europe in the past decade of economic globalization of transferring production plants to low-wage countries (e.g. in Asia) and of persuading West European governments to lower minimum wages and to reduce the high standards of employment. The emergence of more flexible and cheaper kinds of employment relations today implies that – unlike in the past – the equal treatment required by free movement will not always make the citizens of new entrants to the EU less attractive as prospective labour. It merely enables legal employment of these workers, without necessarily bringing about improvements in their pay and working conditions. The course of events after the introduction of free movement and the effect of these changes in labour relations on East-West migration flows depend on the outcome of this struggle in the labour market. Will employers get a more flexible and cheaper labour, or can trade unions turn the tide? Obviously, the development of migratory movements in an enlarged EU depends not only on the classical push and pull factors (e.g. economic and social circumstances, wage levels, and demographic changes) but also on future political decisions regarding the labour market.

3. The future accession of CEECs to the EU and mainly non-European transit migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe

In addition to stimulating East-West migration, the liberalization of travel restrictions motivated migratory movements (originating mainly outside Europe) within and to Central and Eastern Europe, especially transit migration.³⁶ Transit migrants do not consider CEECs their final destination but travel through these countries *en route* to Western Europe and North America. Transit migration has emerged along these routes in Central and Eastern Europe for two reasons. On the one hand, tighter EU control of air routes and international agreements like the Schengen Treaty of 1989 and the Dublin Convention of 1990 impeded access to EU member states for immigrants from developing countries. The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, however, generated ample migration opportunities by providing a new way to reach Western Europe. This route proved particularly interesting, since the wealthiest EU countries are located at the Union's eastern frontier.

The countries at the eastern frontier of Western Europe (i.e. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) were the first to experience the transit phenomenon. Citizens from CEECs further East passed through these countries *en route* to the West. Next, migrants from traditional emigration countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia also began to appreciate the migration opportunities in Eastern Europe. Migrants can reach the CEE transit countries by direct air travel. Since the recent tightening of immigration controls at the airports, most transit migrants now travel by land or sea across several CEECs before arriving at the frontier with the EU. As a result, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, where the economies would not normally attract immigrants, are now inundated with immigrants arriving solely to move on to the rich countries in the West. Central and Eastern Europe, including several states in the CIS and Turkey, have become nodes in a complex network of migration routes (see Appendix V).

Transit routes usually follow a circuitous path (see Appendix V). They are flexible and accommodate changes, whether these are newly emerging opportunities, sudden hindrances (e.g. new immigration restrictions in transit countries), or the outbreak of armed conflicts (e.g. as with the former Yugoslavia, when the routes shifted to Romania and Bulgaria). At the same time migration from Poland or the Czech Republic to Germany has become more difficult due to new restrictions. The establishment of a German-Polish agreement regarding border control, for instance, led these routes to shift to the Czech Republic. The effects of an equivalent German-Czech agreement remain to be analysed (IOM: report about Poland, 1994, and report about the Czech Republic, 1994).

The Federal Republic of Germany and Austria are the most favoured destinations for transit migrants, followed by the Nordic countries, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The transit routes to Western Europe do not always end at the first EU countries where the migrants arrive. In many cases Greece and Italy and also Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany function as secondary transit countries like the CEECs earlier on the route. The routes and destinations of CEE transit migrant also extend beyond the EU, with Switzerland, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia being preferred among transit migrants. Germany and Austria are less slightly popular destinations among transit migrants than among emigrants from CEE headed for Western Europe. The difference is attributable to the migrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa using these transit routes, who migrate according to longstanding patterns that do not necessarily end in the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. These

36. This survey of transit migration is based on the following IOM reports: IOM, *Profiles and Motives of Potential Migrants. An IOM study undertaken in four countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine*, Geneva: IOM, 1993; IOM, *Transit Migration in Romania*, Geneva: IOM, 1993; IOM, *Transit Migration in Bulgaria*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in the Czech Republic*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Hungary*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Poland*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in the Russian Federation*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Ukraine*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Irregular Migration in Central Europe: the Case of Afghan Asylum Seekers in Hungary*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Chinese Migrants in Central and Eastern Europe: the Cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Trafficking and Prostitution: the Growing exploitation of migrant Women from Central and Eastern Europe*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Transit Migration in Turkey*, Geneva: IOM, 1996.

migrants are more likely than their Central and East European counterparts to choose European immigration countries other than the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria as their final destination (see the IOM reports about transit migration).

Transit migrants comprise two categories (IOM: Report about Romania, 1993). The first are the real transit migrants who enter, pass, and leave relatively quickly. They are usually well informed and have sufficient resources and support from a network of friends and family. Here, the CEECs act as a bridge between country of origin and destination. The transient residents, who form the second category, do not leave the transit country quickly but reside there for some time. During this period they gather information about migration opportunities and work in order to finance the next step in the migration process. They use the CEECs as a way-station for future migration (C. Wallace & O Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996: 268-269). Recent trends suggest, however, that most of these people are now getting stuck in what they consider to be a transit country. They lack new migration opportunities for three reasons. First, immigration controls have become tighter in the West as well as in Central Europe. Second, migrants increasingly lack sufficient resources, as a larger share comes from remote places from where the journey is expensive, and because growing numbers from the lower income categories are resorting to emigration. Finally, movements are based on misleading information. Migrants usually rely on information from unofficial channels, as official information is often unavailable, inaccurate, or deemed unreliable by the migrants (especially in the former communist countries). While unofficial information can be surprisingly adequate, it can also be misleading. The trafficker wants to sell his services, and family members or friends who have emigrated do not always admit failures and may romanticize their situation (see the IOM reports about transit migration).

The emigration potential of transit residents is difficult to estimate. On the one hand, most transit residents still want to move West and are awaiting an opportunity. On the other hand, if the transit migration process takes so long that they become settled and obtain regular employment, then the risk of illegal secondary migration becomes less attractive. Even when legal opportunities arise, the expense of starting again in another country is not worth the cost. Many might want to move West but calculate that they will do better by staying where they are. Most transit residents view further migration to Western Europe with caution. Their potential to move in this direction depends on the economic and labour market situations in CEE as well as on the legal opportunities for staying there (see the IOM reports about transit migration).

If the CEECs accede to the EU, the flows of transit migrants will have a limited impact on migration by intra-EU workers after freedom of movement of workers is extended to the CEECs. As this right is granted only to EU citizens, it excludes all third-country nationals (mostly migrants from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and citizens of CEECs not joining the EU at present). Since CEECs will not join the EU as a group but will accede individually, starting with the states along and near the Union's Eastern frontier, the number of transit migrants obtaining the right of free movement will be low. Most transit migrants will fall outside the scope of the free movement of workers.

Usually, transit migration will lead to illegal entrance and employment in the EU. Even efficient border controls can be ineffective in dealing with illegal immigrants. Many migrants enter CEECs and the EU legally by using tourist visas and vouchers or as students,³⁷ only to become illegal immigrants after their legal residence period lapses. They may move legally within Central and Eastern Europe. Only their ultimate entry into Western Europe is illegal, violating the well-protected EU borders rather than the poorly guarded Central and East European ones. Transit migration should therefore be considered, along with its impact on EU labour markets and illegal employment in the overall debate about future labour market trends in the EU and its policies against illegal employment (C.-V. Marie, 1994; M. Miller, 1994

37. Transit migration in Central and Eastern Europe is usually disguised as tourism. Obtaining a transit visa for Bulgaria and Rumania on the way to a "tourist trip" in the Czech Republic is quite easy. Tourist vouchers are readily available in, for instance, the Ukraine. During the Communist period the central authorities issued these vouchers. After the political changes the process was privatized. Today migrants can easily purchase them at small "tourist offices" in the Ukraine and can then move legally to the Czech Republic. Registration as a student at a university is another way of entering CEECs legally, after which these migrants apply for scholarships or employment contracts in the EU. Poland, which charges relatively low tuition and runs many exchange programmes, is used as a stepping stone to the West.

and D.S. North, 1994).

Furthermore, the IOM reports on transit migration in CEE show this pattern to be largely uncontrollable. The situation is unlikely to change, especially since the ongoing heavy pressure for emigration on the frontiers and the determination and desperation of migrants to reach Western Europe makes trafficking in illegal immigrants highly lucrative.

The routes migrants follow and their choice of final destination depend both migration policies, the legislative, economic and political situations in the transit areas and in the country of final immigration and on the functioning and availability of migrant networks. Transit migration can be time-consuming and expensive, in particular with long-distance migration. The process requires careful planning, sufficient resources, and ongoing support. Two types of networks assist migrants: the circle of family, friends, and acquaintances present in the different transit countries and at the final destination and professional traffickers. The traffickers provide a wide range of services, such as information, forged documents (Central and East European as well as West European and American), transportation, accommodation in transit countries, and illegal border crossings either through green borders between check points or through the actual check points by either hiding the migrants or by bribing border police and officials. These services can be obtained separately at any stage of the migration process or as a "migration package" for the entire journey. Given the tight migration restrictions both in Western Europe and in CEE and the growing numbers that are desperate and determined to move to the West, the black market for helping people cross borders is thriving. Prices for illegal migration to the Federal Republic of Germany vary between 400 and 1,000 DM. A complete "migration package" from Pakistan to a West European destination costs up to 10,000 USD (IOM: report about Romania, 1993).

Trafficking is often an international and organized activity. The people involved operate within international networks that devise strategies, adjust quickly to changes in the situation in CEE, accumulate financial resources, and coordinate and contract local groups who arrange short-term accommodation near the border and help with illegal border crossings. Migration to Western Europe can be organized from as far away as Southeast Asia. The phenomenon is becoming a serious problem for various reasons. It is being used more frequently and is a very profitable activity. It is connected to international crime, as many traffickers are involved in smuggling operations as well. There are increasing signs of brutality by traffickers towards migrants (and in particular women),³⁸ who are vulnerable because of the illegality of the procedure. The problem is difficult to fight, however, because of its international structure and the fact that traffickers are resourceful, inventive, and adjust quickly to most situations. Finally, this area is tough for Central and Eastern European countries to control or police individually. The illegal aspects of the transit migration phenomenon (e.g. trafficking) therefore demand special attention and international cooperation, especially once the concept of the internal market and the elimination of internal borders within the EU is expanded eastward.

38. In the past decade trafficking in Central and East European women for prostitution purposes has been increasing. The lower travel costs and easy legal entry as a tourist yields far higher profits than with women from Africa, Asia, and South America. A serious problem is that Central and East European women are considerably younger than the women from overseas areas, the majority is under 25 and many are only between 15 and 18 years old (IOM, *Trafficking and Prostitution: the Growing Exploitation of Migrant Women from Central and Eastern Europe*, Geneva: IOM, 1995).

4. EU enlargement to the East and migratory movements within and to Central and Eastern Europe

Migratory movements towards CEECs tend to be overlooked in the enlargement debate. The possible effect of introduction of free movement of workers with CEECs on the flows is usually discussed from the perspective of East-West migration. Nevertheless, the liberalization of travel restrictions after the political events of 1989 led not only to increased migration to Western Europe. Movements in the opposite direction (i.e. eastward) and mobility within CEE grew considerably as well.

The initial changes in migration flows towards CEECs after 1989 concerned increased mobility among CEECs by CEE citizens. The reasons varied from ethnic migration to tourism and shopping or labour migration. The rise in travel for shopping was especially pronounced, due to the large differences in prices and the availability of consumer goods between the different CEECs. These movements were not always individual or occasional and sometimes evolved into "professional" cross-border trade.³⁹ The rewards of trading are several times greater than income gains from labour migration and often supplement income or even replace labour. Trading and the fact that traders often start small businesses has given rise to networks and contacts between the CEECs, which in turn support other cross-border movements, such as labour migration (C. Wallace & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996).

In addition to involving CEE citizens, the migratory movements to CEECs comprised people from traditional emigration areas in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. During the 1990s as a result of migration restrictions in the EU and the area's economic prosperity (by the standards of CEECs), countries along the EU's eastern frontier started to function as a buffer zone for Western Europe against immigration from the East (C. Wallace & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996). As discussed in Part II of this study, immigration restrictions in Western Europe imposed barriers against moving to the EU. Many transit migrants got stuck in Central Europe or used their stay there to finance and arrange their remaining journey to the West. In addition to transit migrants, refugees flocked to CEECs, as they found applying for asylum in the EU increasingly difficult due to the new regulations in Western Europe prohibiting people from claiming asylum in more than one country and the greater restrictions on awarding refugee status. They started to head for the CEECs, which lacked rigid residence restrictions and maintained liberal asylum policies in the early 1990s (C. Wallace & A. Palyanitsya, 1995: 90). The present absence of large numbers of refugees in Central European countries is attributable to the strict criteria that these countries have devised and enforced out of their reluctance to deal with the burden of all the asylum applications. More importantly, the ample opportunities for working and residing in the CEECs make official refugee status unnecessary for staying in these countries legally. Since living outside refugee camps is far better and employment easy to obtain, only the most desperate are likely to apply for asylum (E. Kussbach, 1992).

Thus, the liberalization of travel restrictions after 1989 has also increased migratory movements within and to CEE aside from the well-known East-West flows. How do the migration patterns in CEE affect intra-EU migration following the introduction of free movement with the applying CEECs? The enlargement debate has highlighted two types of migration in this context: the movement of ethnic migrants and labour immigrants.

The fragmentation of some states, the surge of nationalism, and the suppression of the rights of ethnic minorities by new regimes (which were often intolerant toward ethnic groups) led many to return to what they perceived as their native countries (C. Wallace & A. Palyanitsya, 1995: 100). After 1989 the new regimes in countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia became interested in the Polish, Czech, or Slovak minorities in other CEECs. The relation between the movement of ethnic minorities in CEECs and the introduction of free movement after the future accession will depend on the entitlement of these migrants

39. Trading predates the recent political changes in CEE. The communist economies created a situation whereby constant shortages were matched with high demands for consumer goods. This unsatisfied demand was met by import and cross-border trade, which began during the late 1970s when Poles moved back and forth to Hungary selling cheap merchandise they had brought from Poland (IOM, *Transit Migration in Hungary*, Geneva: IOM, 1994).

to “reclaim” their citizenship following their “return” to their “native countries”. As shown in Section 1.1, EU citizenship is one of the requirements for the right of freedom of movement of workers. After the introduction of free movement, restitution of citizenship therefore implies that these persons are granted the right of free movement within the EU. The movement of ethnic migrants and the attitude of countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (which will be the first to join the EU) have to be analysed.

Two to three million ethnic Poles living in Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine left Poland through the annexation of these areas rather than through emigration. The majority of these people has retained Polish citizenship and has adjusted to Russia only gradually. Their return migration potential is considerable, especially those whose standard of living has deteriorated due to economic or political changes (P. Korcelli, 1994: 185 and M. Okolski, 1994: 63). Moreover, the Polish government and several cultural institutions are actively working to cultivate or revive Polish identity and culture among the various groups. Possible repatriation of Polish communities from the former USSR is under consideration, as these people and their descendants are considered entitled to restitution of their citizenship and to residence in Poland (M. Okolski, 1994: 63, 64).

As for the ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, the Hungarian government aims to offer a safe haven to all Hungarians subject to persecution or discrimination while safeguarding the survival of the Hungarian communities in surrounding countries (M. Redei, 1994: 90). Naturalization is easy for ethnic Hungarians and close relatives of former Hungarian citizens. Their citizenship is returned on request without a waiting period, whereas non-ethnic Hungarians receiving preference wait two to six years and others ten to twelve years (J. Juhász, 1996: 73-74).

In 1990, a few Czechoslovakian humanitarian organizations decided to resettle Czech descendants living in most of the regions affected by the Chernobyl disaster. What started as ecological migration eventually became a movement for economic reasons. Most migrants from the Chernobyl areas worried less about pollution than about enjoying a better lifestyle in Czechoslovakia. These movements were followed by discussions about resettling Czechs and Slovaks from other parts of the former USSR. In 1991 Czechoslovakia offered all people able to prove Czech descendancy the option of moving to Czechoslovakia with their entire families (Z. Pavlik & J. Maresova, 1994: 121). Between 1991 and 1993 about 2,000 ethnic Czechs exercised this right. They received transport, accommodation, and financial aid but were not offered Czech citizenship immediately. Only after a five-year residence period could they apply for Czech nationality. These ethnic migrants did not receive the privileges that their German, Hungarian, and Polish counterparts did (C. Wallance & A. Palyanitsya, 1995: 101-102).

In sum, all three countries have taken an interest in the situation of ethnic minorities in other CEECs and have supported their repatriation (Poland and Hungary to a greater extent than the Czech Republic). Only in the cases of Poland and Hungary, where ethnic Poles and Hungarians can reclaim their citizenship fairly easily after “returning” to Poland or Hungary, will the introduction of free movement immediately extend to these persons. Nevertheless, because the ethnic groups are rather small and tend to return first to their perceived mother countries, the effect of these flows on intra-EU migration will probably be limited.

Labour migration flows to the countries along the EU's eastern frontier are another matter to be addressed within the enlargement debate. Under Communism, temporary migration (mainly for work purposes) was typical in Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR. Bilateral labour agreements were reached between the members of the Warsaw Pact countries and later extended to the non-European Communist countries, especially Vietnam and Cuba (see: T. Freika, 1996 and the IOM study about Hungary).

At present in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, higher wages and relatively low unemployment compared with other CEECs coexist with a demand for labour. The changing structure of the post-Communist labour market has entailed a reduction in employment with the government and in heavy industries, along with a rise in the service, tourism, and construction sectors. As a result, labour demand and supply are mismatched. The unemployed do not necessarily live in areas where new jobs are available or may be unqualified for these positions. The new jobs differ from employment under the old system, in that they are more flexible, have a higher turnover, and are often short-term and insecure (which discourages candidates from moving to another part of the country or leaving a secure position). Accordingly, the new vacancies tend to be filled with immigrant labour. As in Western Europe, Central

European countries face the problems of motivating the unemployed to accept flexible work and preventing immigration. Immigrants from Eastern Europe and the CIS perform the same casual jobs in the labour markets in Central European countries that Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and Slovaks are accepting further West. Therefore, employment mobility in Central and Eastern Europe is starting to resemble a stack of dominoes (C. Wallance & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996 and J. Salt & J.A. Clarke, 1996).

The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are fairly similar with respect to their foreign labour forces. The majority tends to comprise citizens from the former USSR (Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Most work for Polish companies in construction, heavy industry, and agriculture. Migratory flows with Central and Eastern Europe are circular at present but could become more permanent. Many start as commuters and become permanent migrants after establishing social and economic ties with the receiving country. The migration movements are extremely well organized and often guided by immigrant networks, intermediaries, subcontractors, or work crews. The development and use of the foreign labour force is starting to reflect ethnic niches. In the Czech construction sector, Ukrainians are most often recruited along ethnic lines. The control of these groups over access to sectors of the labour market can prevent workers from other parts of the Ukraine or elsewhere from penetrating.

In addition to the Central and East Europeans, persons from outside the area are beginning to appreciate immigration opportunities in CEECs. Immigrants arriving from Asian countries (Vietnam and China) usually work in the food industry or in trading companies. Most are not employed as workers but hold executive positions in firms. Since a residence permit is easier to obtain as an "executive" than as a worker, many Asians start joint ventures or migrate as the executives of small firms. West Europeans and Americans arrive as advisors and consultants, business people, or staff of international organizations. Another large group of Westerners consists of young immigrants (especially young Americans),⁴⁰ who enjoy residing in Central Europe - often in Prague. They are in their early twenties and have graduated. They either bring their own money or take odd jobs, such as teaching English (C. Wallance & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996 and J. Salt & J.A. Clarke, 1996).

What role do these migration patterns play in the present enlargement debate? Individual accession to the Union by the CEECs would mean introducing the right of freedom of movement for workers gradually to increasing numbers of Central and East European citizens and would give rise to two possible issues.

The first issue concerns the impact of migration flows toward CEECs on the course of intra-EU migration after the introduction of free movement of workers with the applying CEECs. In recent years immigrant networks and contacts have been established all over Central and Eastern Europe creating strong connections between the CEECs. Thus, citizens of CEECs increasingly have migration links with other CEECs rather than with West European countries (see: C. Wallance & A. Palyanitsya, 1995, and C. Wallance & O. Chmouliar & E. Sidorenko, 1996). Accession of East European countries to the EU and the consequent introduction of free movement might lead many migrants to exercise their right of free movement to migrate to other Central and East European member states rather than to the present EU member states in Western Europe. In this event, not all migratory movements within an enlarged Union would be directed westward. The enlargement debate should therefore extend its focus beyond East-West migration and should not assume that all migratory movements within an enlarged Union will be directed at the Western members. During and after the enlargement procedure, the more prosperous CEECs might very well attract a substantial part of the CEE labour migrants.

This brings us to the second point, which concerns the possible impact of migration flows in CEE on the negotiations leading to the EU's expansion to the East. This enlargement will take place by individual countries, with the first candidates for accession already becoming receiving areas for immigrants arriving from the CEECs that are further East. A situation could arise where the most recent entrants (e.g. the Czech Republic) would object in the Council of Ministers to the introduction of free movement of workers with other CEECs, just as the present EU member states are doing now. The first CEECs to accede to the EU may become more attractive to new immigrants because of their membership of the Union and the potential economic advantages. In other words, after the Czech Republic joins the EU, for example, it might oppose

40. The number of young Americans in the Czech Republic is about 10,000-40,000 (US Embassy estimates about 12,000). They are the largest national minority in that country.

the establishment of free movement with Bulgaria (which would then be in the process of applying for membership) because of high Bulgarian immigration to the Czech Republic.

Summary

This study examines the possible effect of the enlargement of the European Union with Central and East European countries with respect to the free movement of workers in the context of the impact of previous EC enlargements on migratory movements. The Community's past experiences in this field - the establishment of the right of freedom of movement of workers during the 1960s and its successive introduction after four enlargements⁴¹ - demonstrate that new accessions have never given rise to large migratory movements. To comprehend these past events and to establish a basis for estimating the possible effects of the introduction of free movement after the EU's eastern enlargements, this study aims to explain *why* free movement has never before stimulated mass migration.

The first reason that free movement did not fuel massive intra-Community labour migration was that it was not designed to do so. Four general restrictions on the system of free movement prevented such a course. First, free movement reaches a limited group of migrants, since it is granted only to citizens of the member states who take up paid employment. Other types of migrants, third-country nationals, and those who do not qualify as paid employees are not entitled to use the rights granted under the free movement of workers. Second, free movement merely facilitated intra-Community migration. It did not address migration to the Communities or movements from the integrated area to a third destination. The third limitation resulted from the fact that it did not establish strong and active institutional linkages between the labour markets of its member states. Until the recent establishment of EURES, no arrangements existed for contact between demand and supply on the labour markets of different member states. Nor was there any financial or logistic support for migration to simplify and reduce the cost of the recruitment procedure or professional and language training programmes for migrant workers. Finally, the equal treatment provision limits the free movement of workers. In addition to protecting foreign workers from being exploited, it curtailed the ability of employers to recruit "cheap" immigrants instead of local workers as a way of reducing labour costs.

The system's limitations are the first reason why the free movement of workers did not give rise to massive intra-Community migration in the past and probably will not in the future either. Nor were the circumstances surrounding the introduction of free movement of workers conducive to an increase in the number of migrants. If these circumstances have changed, however, the introduction of free movement of workers with the applying CEECs might very well have a larger impact on labour movements than in the past. Previous experiences with the introduction of free movement revealed about six particular circumstances that diminished the impact of the introduction on the numbers of migrants. Comparison of these circumstances with the possible accession of CEEs offers the following picture.

The effect of the introduction of free movement is first of all related to the extent to which administrative restrictions hindered the migration process before. Contrary to the introduction of free movement with Italy during the 1960s, East-West migration flows are now indeed severely hindered by restrictive immigration policies and legislation of EU member states. In fact, trends in East-West migration seem to be more a reflection of these policies than an indication of their potential. This leads us to the second factor, namely the size and direction of migration flows when free movement was introduced. At the time of past introductions of free movement, the flows had already peaked. This may not hold true for East-West migration. Permanent emigration for family and ethnic reasons may have fallen, but short-term migratory movements for employment purposes, which conform to the definition of free movement, are increasing.

The third aspect indicated by past experiences is the dependence of migration flows on economic and labour market trends after the introduction of free movement. The push factors in Central and East Europe

41. The first enlargement took place in 1972, when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the EC. Greece joined the EC in 1981, and free movement was introduced with that country in 1988. Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 and were scheduled for free movement of workers in 1993 but actually received it in 1991. The latest enlargement took place during the 1990s, when Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU.

remain significant. Bad economic conditions and labour market situations and low relative wage levels still cause considerable emigration pressure. No clear signs are perceptible of immediate economic improvement that might reduce this pressure. While in some countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) such recovery might come soon, in others (e.g. the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, and Russia) the economic situation will remain difficult for a long time. Despite the drop in official emigration and immigration figures during the first half of the 1990s, the emigration potential should not be underestimated. The number of potential emigrants and more importantly their readiness to move remain very high. Furthermore, the migratory movements that got under way after the recent political changes are still in a rather early phase and show signs of circular migration. Such first migration experiences might increase the level of mobility in the future, as the people who have already moved once or twice are likely to consider doing so again.

Regardless of the economic push factors and their willingness to emigrate, however, the potential emigrants will realize their aim of emigrating to Western Europe only if sufficient employment opportunities are available in the receiving countries. Historically, migration flows under the free movement regime have reacted primarily to the demand for workers on the labour markets. Demand in the West European labour markets is often deemed insufficient for large-scale labour immigration to take place. Nevertheless, determining whether demand for immigrant labour exists requires differentiating between short and long-distance movements and between temporary and permanent migration and examining the relative demand for labour according to each factor.

High unemployment rates within the EU and a demand for skilled workers are unlikely to stimulate large migratory movements that are permanent or long term, as illustrated by the present intra-EU movements. Permanent immigration in significant numbers will probably not be forthcoming in the near future. This argument is based on the present unemployment levels within the EU, resulting from economic downturn and upswing, the ageing of the population, and women's participation in the labour market.

Temporary migration and short-term employment could rise following the introduction of free movement. Recent labour market trends toward labour flexibility indicate short-term recruitment and consequently – notwithstanding the high unemployment within the EU – a growing demand for flexible, short-term, insecure immigrant labour.

Intra-Community migratory movements thus far show that the right of freedom of movement of workers has an impact upon cross-border migration. None of the Union's previous enlargements admitted applicants with a high emigration potential located along the extended frontier from Finland via the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria to Italy and Greece. Contrary to earlier enlargements, labour migration may rise substantially following the East European accessions. On the push side, the general economic and labour market situations in the frontier countries and in certain border regions in particular continue to stimulate emigration. At the same time, across the Union's eastern frontier the wage differentials between the EU and Central and East European countries is greater than ever due to the location of the Union's wealthiest countries there. Nevertheless, even if wages between the frontier countries in Central and Eastern Europe reach German and Austrian levels, migratory movements can be expected, since cross-border migration is a strong regional trend. Frontier migrants are motivated not only by differences in wages but also by working conditions and terms of employment, distance from the nearest employment opportunity in their home country, migrant networks, and cultural and language similarities. All these aspects figure in the emigration decision and lead to a preference for frontier countries such as Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, the push and pull factors driving this migration process operate at both sides of the frontier, while improvements in infrastructure and less rigid entrance restrictions for the citizens of several CEE frontier states simplify East-West cross-border migration. Therefore, this kind of migration may very well rise following the accession of the CEECs to the Union and the introduction of the free movement of workers. This trend's regional nature might lead it to become more permanent, even if an economic upswing in the CEECs at the EU's eastern frontier reduces the push for emigration.

Comparing the previous introductions of free movement with present East-West migration processes reveals that many of the circumstances have changed. Significant numbers of potential migrants are present in the CEECs. Furthermore, East-West migration is boosted by established intermediary structures linking the sending with the receiving areas. Thus, abolishing the current restrictive West European policies and

legislative restrictions towards citizens of CEECs through the introduction of free movement will facilitate East-West movements and especially short-term and cross-border flows. Unlike in the past, establishing free movement of workers upon the accession of CEECs at present might have a substantial impact on East-West migratory movements. The real consequences of a future introduction depend first of all on labour market trends within the EU (e.g. unemployment, demographic change, and women's participation in the labour market) and second on emigration incentives in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the higher wages in Western Europe and the chance of a better income are the most important motivation behind present East-West movements, the wage levels with respect to the prices and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe are important indicators.

Two factors might diminish the impact of free movement of workers on the flows. Historical case studies demonstrate, in the first place, that emigrants have sometimes preferred destinations other than the member states. In the current East-West migration EU member states are not the exclusive final destinations: potential emigrants also aim to migrate to countries such as Switzerland and overseas destinations. Second and more importantly, free movement may not be the main legal instrument regulating East-West migrations within an enlarged EU. Movements under the provisions for the free supply of services and self-employment enable alternative migration and job opportunities that employers seem to prefer to arrangements based on free movement. Labour circulation within the EU under the system of contract workers or as self-employed workers instead of as wage employees is an established pattern in the history of free movement. The present association regime already allows citizens of several CEECs to enter the EU as self-employed persons. EU employers are attracted by these kinds of employment relations, which provide the only legal opportunity for CEE citizens to move into the EU area. East-West migration regulated by these legal arrangements may become or already is a significant phenomenon and will consequently mitigate impact of the introduction of free movement on East-West flows. Obviously, the course of events will depend on the interplay of the social partners in the EU labour markets: will employers succeed in establishing a cheaper and more flexible labour force, or will the trade unions reverse this trend?

Two other migration flows besides East-West migration play a role in the enlargement debate: transit migration and migratory movements to CEECs. Transit migration concerns migration between CEECs, as well as movements mainly from the Third World via these countries toward Western Europe. These flows consist of Central and East European citizens on the one hand and of nationals of traditional emigration countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia on the other. Transit migration will have a limited impact on the number of intra-EU labour migrants after the accession of the CEECs. Initially, only the states at and near the Union's Eastern frontier will enter, and their number of transit migrants is rather small. The flows towards Central European countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic play a different role within the enlargement debate. Given that the initial accession may include only the states at the Union's Eastern frontier, subsequent EU entry of the East European countries and the introduction of free movement may lead Hungarians, Poles, Czechs to migrate to other Central European countries rather westward. Finally, if the Union's eastward enlargements continue, and more CEECs enter, the migratory movements within the enlarged Union may not all be directed at its Western member states. In future enlargement negotiations, Central European countries such as the Czech Republic may - following their accession - use their vote in the Council of Ministers to object to the introduction of free movement with applying CEECs, as the present EU member states are doing now, based on the fear that such introduction of free movement will lead to large, unwanted immigration flows.

This comparison of past and future EU enlargements reveals the impossibility of the simple extrapolations often made but also the possibility of detailed comparisons as to specific types of inspiration. The outcome is a rather subtle and varied picture of possible scenarios.

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Appendix I: Central and East European Immigrant population present in Western Europe

Table 1: Central and East European immigrant population in Finland (thousands)

country	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total stock foreign population	17.0	17.3	17.7	18.7	21.2	26.6	37.6	46.3	55.6	62.0	68.6
Former USSR	1.6	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.4	4.2	9.7	11.9	13.3	15.1	15.9
Estonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	3.4	5.9	7.5	8.4
Former Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.4	2.4	2.3	2.4
Poland	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Hungary	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	...

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 225.

Table 2: Central and East European immigrant population in Germany (thousands)

country	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Former Yugoslavia	591.0	591.2	551.9	579.1	610.5	662.7	775.1	915.6	929.6	834.8	797.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	139.1	249.4	316.0
Poland	104.8	116.9	120.6	171.5	220.4	242.0	271.2	285.6	260.5	263.4	276.7
Croatia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	153.1	176.3	185.1
Former USSR	6.7	7.1	6.9	8.4	11.5	18.2	52.8	-	63.6	61.6	58.3
Hungary	21.4	23.1	21.8	26.6	31.6	36.7	56.4	61.4	62.2	58.0	56.7
Former CSFR	28.2	29.1	25.7	27.9	31.7	34.4	46.7	63.7	52.0	43.0	34.1

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 227.

Table 3: Central and East European immigrant population in Italy (thousands)

country	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total stock foreign population	423.0	450.2	572.1	645.4	490.4	781.1	863.0	925.2	987.4	922.7	991.4
Former Yugoslavia	13.9	14.5	19.0	21.8	17.1	29.8	33.9	44.5	27.4	89.4	52.0
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.4	28.5	30.8	31.9	34.7
Rumania	-	-	-	-	-	7.5	13.5	16.4	19.4	20.2	24.5
Poland	-	10.3	14.0	16.9	10.1	17.0	19.1	21.2	21.1	18.9	22.0

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 228.

Table 4: Central and East European immigrant population in Sweden (thousands)

country	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total stock foreign population	388.6	390.8	401.0	421.0	456.0	483.7	493.8	499.1	507.5	537.4	531.8
Former Yugoslavia	38.4	38.4	38.7	38.9	39.6	41.1	41.0	39.6	32.4	40.4	38.4
Poland	15.5	15.6	15.1	14.3	14.7	15.7	16.1	16.4	16.1	16.1	16.0
Rumania	1.2	1.6	2.3	3.4	4.4	5.3	5.5	5.6	5.0	4.7	4.2
Hungary	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.0

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 235.

Table 5: Central and East European immigrant population in Switzerland (thousands)

country	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total stock foreign population	939.7	956.0	978.7	1,006.5	1,040.3	1,100.3	1,163.2	1,213.5	1,260.3	1,300.1	1,330.6
Former Yugoslavia	69.5	77.4	87.6	100.7	116.8	140.7	171.2	208.3	245.0	272.4	294.2
Former CSFR	7.1	6.5	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.0
Poland	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.8
Hungary	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.8

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 236.

Table 6 Central and East Europeans in EU member states as at 1 January 1993 (thousands)

Table 6 Central and East Europeans in EU member states as at 1 January 1993 (thousands)

	Aust	B	DM	FinL	Fr	FRG	Gr	IrL	I	Lux	NL	P	Sp	S	UK	Total
Bulgaria	3.6	-	0.2	0.3	1.0	59.1	4.4	-	5.7	-	0.6	0.2	0.6	2.1	3.1	80.9
Former CSFR:	11.3	0.6	0.4	0.2	2.4	63.7	1.2	-	4.8	-	0.8	0.1	0.4	1.7	2.8	90.4
Czech Republic	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
Slovak Republic	-	-	0.0	*	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	1.0	-	1.0
Hungary	10.6	0.7	0.3	0.4	2.7	61.4	0.9	-	5.0	-	1.2	0.1	0.2	3.5	3.3	90.3
Poland	18.3	4.8	5.0	0.7	47.1	285.6	10.7	-	21.2	-	5.4	0.2	3.2	16.4	20.8	439.4
Romania	18.5	-	1.0	0.3	5.1	167.3	3.9	-	16.4	-	1.9	0.1	0.9	5.7	=	221.1
Former USSR	2.1	1.2	1.2	15.5	4.7	79.0	8.2	-	10.5	-	2.1	0.3	1.2	0.8	15.2	142.0
Albania	0.9	-	*	*	-	11.8	3.5	-	28.5	-	-	*	*	0.1	=	44.8
Former Yugoslavia	197.9	7.5	11.3	0.5	52.5	1,018.10	2.6	-	44.5	-	18.8	0.1	0.6	39.6	15.8	1,409.80
Total	263.2	14.8	19.4	17.9	115.5	1,746	35.4	-	136.6	0	30.8	1.1	7.1	70.9	61	2,519.70

= figures below 1,000

* figures below 50

Source: Salt J. & Clarke, J.A., "European Migration Report", *New Community*, 22(3), 1996: 524-525.

Appendix II: Central and East European Immigrant labour in Austria and the Federal Republic

Table 1: Central and East European immigrant labour in Austria (thousands)

country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total foreign labour force	150.9	167.4	217.6	266.5	273.9	277.5	268.8	269.7	257.2
Former Yugoslavia	83.1	90.8	110.5	129.1	133.6	126.6	118.6	108.0	94.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.4	22.8	28.1
Croatia	-	-	-	-	1.2	6.4	11.7	16.0	19.2
Poland	-	-	-	-	11.1	11.0	11.1	10.8	10.1
Hungary	-	-	-	-	10.1	10.0	9.9	9.6	9.2
Rumania	-	-	-	-	9.2	9.3	9.5	9.3	8.7
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	1.3	4.3	5.5	5.8	6.0
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	2.7	3.6	4.0
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	1.8	2.9	3.7
Former CSFR	-	-	-	-	10.7	9.5	6.4	3.9	2.1
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 238.

Table 2: Central and East European immigrant labour in the Federal Republic (thousands)

country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total foreign labour force	2,025.1	2,179.1	2,360.1	2,575.9	2,559.6	2,569.2
contract workers by nationality¹						
Poland	15.4	41.9	63.5	11.5	19.2	28.8
Hungary	6.1	11.3	15.0	15.2	9.2	10.2
Croatia	-	-	-	8.3	5.3	5.2
Czech Republic ²	2.0	7.8	13.2	1.3	2.6	2.5
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	1.2	2.2	2.4
Slovenia	-	-	-	2.8	1.4	1.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6.8	9.5	8.7	1.6	1.2	1.0
Rumania	-	3.7	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	-	1.0	-	-	-	-
Total	32.1	76.6	115.1	63.3	48.4	54.4
Seasonal workers by nationality³						
Poland	-	-	-	143.7	136.7	170.6
Croatia	-	-	-	7.0	5.8	5.6
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	7.8	3.9	5.4
Rumania	-	-	-	3.9	2.3	3.9
Czech Republic	-	-	-	12.0	3.5	3.7
Hungary	-	-	-	5.3	2.5	2.8
Slovenia	-	-	-	1.1	0.6	0.6
Bulgaria	-	-	-	0.7	0.7	0.1
Total				181.7	155.8	192.8

¹ Contract workers are recruited under bilateral agreements and quotas by country of origin are revised annually.

² Former CSFR until 1992.

³ Seasonal workers are recruited under bilateral agreements and they are allowed to work 3 months per year.

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 106, 107, 242.

Appendix III: Central and East European Migration to Australia, Canada and the US

Australia

Table A1: Immigrant population by place of birth in Australia, 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991 (thousands).

	1971	1981	1986	1991
Total immigrant population	2,579.3	3,003.8	3,247.4	3,753.3
Percentage of total population	20.3	20.6	20.8	22.3
Total Europe	2,196.5	2,232.7	2,221.8	2,300.3
Former Yugoslavia	129.8	149.3	150.0	161.1
Poland	59.7	59.4	67.7	68.9

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 229.

Table A2: Acquisition of Australian nationality by country of former nationality, 1988-1993.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total	81,218	119,140	127,857	118,510	125,158	122,085
Former Yugoslavia	2,871	3,999	4,726	3,679	3,487	2,972
Poland	1,475	1,774	2,227	1,901	2,111	2,069

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 241.

Table A3: Inflows of permanent settlers in Australia by country of birth, 1984-1994 (Thousands).

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total	69.8	78.1	92.4	113.3	143.5	145.3	121.2	121.7	107.4	76.3	69.8
Former USSR	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.7	0.9	2.0	2.7	1.4
Poland	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.0	0.7

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 235.

Canada

Table B1: Immigrant population by place of birth in Canada, 1981, 1986, 1991 (Thousands).

	1981	1986	1991
Total Immigrant Population	3,843.3	3,908.0	4,342.9
Percentage of total population	16.1	15.4	16.1
Total Europe	2,567.9	2,435.1	2,364.7
Poland	148.5	156.8	184.7
Former USSR	128.4	109.4	99.4
Former Yugoslavia	91.6	87.8	88.8
Hungary	64.6	61.3	57.0
Former CSFR	41.6	42.3	42.6

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 230.

Table B2: Acquisition of Canadian nationality by country of former nationality, 1988-1993.

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total	58,810	87,478	104,267	118,630
Poland	2,808	3,674	5,853	6,270
Former Yugoslavia	559	716	931	1,035
Former CSFR	562	882	1,077	776

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 241.

Table B3: Inflows of permanent settlers in Canada by country of birth, 1984-1994 (Thousands).

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total	89.2	88.2	84.3	99.2	152.1	161.9	192.0	214.2	230.8	252.8	254.3
Total Europe	24.3	20.9	18.9	22.7	37.6	40.7	52.1	51.9	48.1	44.9	46.3
Poland	5.1	4.5	3.6	5.2	7.0	9.2	16.0	16.6	15.7	11.9	6.9

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 236.

The United States

Table C1: Immigrant population by place of birth in the United States, 1970, 1980, 1990 (Thousands).

	1981	1986	1991
Total Immigrant Population	9,619.3	14,079.9	19,767.3
Percentage of total population	4.7	6.2	7.9
Total Europe	5,712.0	5,149.3	4,350.4
Former USSR	463.5	406.0	398.9
Poland	548.1	418.1	388.3
Former Yugoslavia	158.7	153.0	141.5
Hungary	188.3	144.4	110.3
Former CSFR	160.9	112.7	87.0

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 231.

Table C2: Acquisition of American nationality by country of former nationality, 1988-1993.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total	242,063	223,777	270,101	308,058	240,252	314,681
Poland	4,145	5,002	5,972	5,493	4,681	5,551
Former USSR	5,304	3,020	2,847	2,822	1,648	2,763

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 242.

Table C3: Inflows of permanent settlers in the US by country of birth, 1984-1994 (thousands).

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
--	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------

Total	559.8	543.9	570.0	601.7	601.5	643.0	1,0909.9	1,536.5	1,827. 2	974.0	904.3
Total Europe	58.9	64.1	63.0	62.5	61.2	64.8	82.9	112.4	135.2	145.4	158.3
Former USSR	5.2	6.1	3.5	2.6	2.4	2.9	11.1	25.5	57.0	43.6	58.6
Poland	6.4	9.5	9.5	8.5	7.5	9.5	15.1	20.5	19.2	25.5	27.8

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1994: 237.

Appendix IV: Regional Labour Market Trends: the regions at the EU frontier

the Baltics:

Although, the Baltics do not share a land frontier with any EU country, they are still at a relative short geographical distance with the Nordic member states and the sea routes make short distance migration possible. Yet, in all cases the regions near the sea have the best labour market variables, while the regions more land inwards and at the frontier with Russia are usually in poorer conditions. (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 69-70).

Bulgaria:

The regions in Bulgaria with the best labour market situations are Sofia and the Southern regions at the Greek border as for instance Plovdiv. While in most regions, unemployment during 1995 increased, it were exactly the Southern regions (Rousse and Haskovo) which did not follow this pattern (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 67).

the Czech Republic:

Since 1989, total employment has declined in all most all regions in the Czech Republic with the exception of Prague. The regions, which are most affected by decline in employment and which are most vulnerable in terms of future developments, are first of all the regions with high employment levels in agriculture: South Bohemia and South Moravia, which both share a long frontier with the Federal Republic and Austria and are at a short geographical distance of large cities as Vienna and Munich. Other problem areas in terms of labour market developments are mono-company cities, or those areas which depend upon one or more large plants. Most of them are situated in the North Bohemia and North Moravia, however also a town like Pilsen, which is not far located from the German border might experience future increases in unemployment. (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 65-66). H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann (1997) indicate that in particular the regions at the Austrian frontier have a high emigration potential

Hungary:

The most poorest labour market conditions are to be found in the countries eastern regions of Hungary. The countries Western regions at the EU frontier are in a considerably better situation (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 64). Nevertheless also these regions have a considerable emigration potential (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 34-35).

Poland:

Due to for instance the collapse of state farms, which has resulted in sharp falls in agriculture employment, the Polish Northern and Western regions, at the EU frontier, have the highest unemployment rates in Poland. Futhermore, only a few changes might perhaps be expected in these regions in the near future, as agriculture employment is already at a low level, industrial employment moderate and the demand for services has already been largley filled (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 63-64). Therefore the North-West regions are among the regions with a high emigration potential (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 33-34).

Slovakia:

In Slovakia in particular the Central and Eastern regions at the frontier with Hungary have high unemployment rates. These regions, as well as, the Hungarian Eastern regions on the other side of the border face severe unemployment, due to changes in the structure of the heavy industries and mining sectors (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 66,67).

The regions at the frontier with Austria are in a better position and show a relatively low emigration potential (H. Fassmann & C. Hintermann, 1997: 32).

Slovenia:

In Slovenia the lowest unemployment levels are to be found in the Goriska region, Central Slovenia and Obalno-Kraska, while the agriculture region of Podravska faces the highest unemployment rates. But one has to realize that in most cases unemployment levels have been reduced to some degree by international migration. About 3.1 percent of the total working age population is employed outside Slovenia and in the region Pomursk the level even reached 7.7 percent. Emigration is noticeable in particular in regions which experienced labour market problems in the past (European Policies Research Centre (a.o.), 1997: 68, 69).

Appendix V: The major routes of transit migration in Central and Eastern Europe*

Transit migrants travelling via Central and Eastern Europe enter the EU by passing through its Central European neighboring states.

- Poland and the Czech Republic are passed on the way to Germany;
- Hungary acts as a transit country for migration to Austria;
- the Baltic States are the last on the route to the Nordic countries;
- Greece is accessible from Bulgaria;
- from Turkey migrants move either to Greece or Italy;
- and now that the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia has ended Slovenia perhaps once again functions as a transit country for migration to Italy and Austria.

In recent years there are generally three major routes from East to West:

- I From East and South East Asia and the Middle East by plane to Moscow and from there over land to either:
 - a: St. Petersburg and from there either:
 - to the Nordic countries or;
 - via Poland (directly or passing the Czech Republic) to the Federal Republic.
 - b: to the Ukraine and then either:
 - to the West passing the Slovak Republic and from there via Hungary to Austria, or via the Czech Republic (directly or via Poland) and finally arriving in the Federal Republic; or
 - to the South passing Rumania and Bulgaria on the way to Greece.
- II Arrival by plane in Bulgaria or Rumania and then in northern direction to the Ukraine and the Slovak Republic or in a southern direction to Greece.
- III From Africa and the Middle East to Turkey and from there directly to Greece and Italy or passing Bulgaria and Rumania, in the direction of North-West Europe and the Nordic countries.

* This survey of transit migration flows is based on the following IOM reports: IOM, *Profiles and Motives of Potential Migrants. An IOM study undertaken in four countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine*, Geneva: IOM, 1993; IOM, *Transit Migration in Romania*, Geneva: IOM, 1993; IOM, *Transit Migration in Bulgaria*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in the Czech Republic*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Hungary*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Poland*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in the Russian Federation*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Transit Migration in Ukraine*, Geneva: IOM, 1994; IOM, *Irregular Migration in Central Europe: the Case of Afghan Asylum Seekers in Hungary*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Chinese Migrants in Central and Eastern Europe: the Cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Trafficking and Prostitution: the Growing exploitation of migrant Women from Central and Eastern Europe*, Geneva: IOM, 1995; IOM, *Transit Migration in Turkey*, Geneva: IOM, 1996.

Appendix VI: Immigration in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary

Table 1: Foreign workers in the Czech Republic by country of origin, 1990-1996¹
(Thousands)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Slovak workers ²	-	-	-	23.3	39.2	59.3	67.0
Registered foreign workers:	95.5	29.8	14.5	28.2	32.9	52.5	67.3
CEEC's:							
Ukraine	-	-	-	7.7	12.7	26.7	38.1
Poland	54.8	16.8	7.2	10.6	8.7	12.1	12.3
Bulgaria	-	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8
Russia	-	-	-	1.3	0.6	0.7	0.7
Rumania	-	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.6
Former Yugoslavia	3.0	1.9	1.3	1.9	1.9	-	-
Hungary	-	0.3	0.1	-	-	-	-
EU:							
Germany	-	-	-	0.7	1.1	1.5	1.3
UK	-	-	-	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3
Non European:							
US	-	-	-	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.7
Vietnam	34.0	9.8	5.5	0.6	0.4	-	-

¹: Former CSFR until 1992. Data refer to the stock on the 31 December of each year, except in 1992 and 1996 (30 June).

²: Under the Mutual Employment of Citizens signed by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in October 1992, nationals of the two Republics have free access to both labour markets. The estimates of the number of Slovaks are made by the local labour offices.

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 89.

Table 2: Foreigners who hold a permanent or a long-term residence permit in the Czech Republic by nationality, 1992-1995¹

	1992			1993			1994			1995		
	PRP	LTRP	Total	PRP	LTRP	Total	PRP	LTRP	Total	PRP	LTRP	Total
CEEc's:												
Slovak Republic ²	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,960	13,818	16,778	6,540	33,185	39,725
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,563	12,667	14,230	2,120	26,038	28,158
Poland	10,420	2,233	12,653	12,580	8,655	21,235	11,910	8,111	20,021	12,071	10,982	23,053
Former Yugoslavia	883	1,499	2,382	1,404	3,696	5,100	1,033	2,993	4,026	1,275	3,549	4,824
Russia	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,734	1,877	3,611	1,670	2,717	4,387
Bulgaria	2,284	587	2,871	2,877	1,172	4,049	2,632	1,140	3,772	2,686	1,596	4,282
Romania	4	186	190	55	489	544	614	749	1,363	804	824	1,628
CIS	3,848	1,689	5,537	4,650	8,883	13,533	-	-	-	-	-	-
EU:												
Germany	757	763	1,520	966	1,976	2,942	1,272	2,923	4,195	1,696	3,857	5,553
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	575	1,300	1,875	657	1,300	2,223
UK	-	-	-	-	-	-	91	1,274	1,365	142	1,798	1,940
Greece	2,350	110	2,460	2,016	189	2,205	1,569	328	1,897	1,117	456	1,573
Non European:												
Vietnam	570	2,078	2,648	1,004	6,785	7,789	1,082	8,550	9,633	1,469	12,722	14,213
US	651	832	1,483	1,015	1,621	2,636	1,234	2,256	3,490	1,427	2,988	4,415
China	23	1,331	1,354	24	2,543	2,567	35	2,872	2,907	24	4,186	4,210
Others	2,725	5,349	8,074	3,850	10,061	13,911	4,859	10,372	14,535	4,859	13,574	18,433
Total	24,515	16,657	41,172	30,441	46,070	76,511	32,468	71,230	103,698	38,557	120,060	158,617

¹: 31 December of each year. Former CSFR in 1992.

²: Up to 1993 Slovak permanent residents were registered in the National Population Register. Since the split of the Czech and Slovak republics, Slovaks residing in the Czech republic are subject to the same rules as any other foreign resident and they are registered in the Central Registry of Foreigners.

PRP: Permanent Residence Permit: these are issued in the case of family reunification, on humanitarian grounds or for foreign policy interests.

LTRP: Long-Term Residence Permits: these are valid for one year and may be renewed.

Source: OECD: Sopemi, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 88.

Table 3: Foreign residents* in Hungary by nationality between 1988-1995 (thousands).

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
CEEC's								
Rumania	5.8	13.4	12.6	6.5	5.3	5.7	3.8	2.5
Former Yugoslavia	0.1	0.1	0.2	3.0	2.9	4.9	2.3	1.1
Former USSR	0.6	0.6	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	0.8
Poland	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Former CSFR	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bulgaria	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-
EU								
Germany	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2
Greece	-	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Asia								
China	-	-	0.6	1.9	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Vietnam	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-
US	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Others	0.8	1.1	1.7	1.8	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.0
Total	8.2	16.7	17.4	16.3	12.5	14.8	10.7	6.5

* Persons who have held a residence permit with a one year length of stay and are still living in the country as of January 1996. Figures include some asylum seekers and refugees.

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 115.

Table 4: Foreign residents in Poland, by region and nationality between 1992-1995 (thousands).

	1992	1993	1994	1995
Permanent immigration by region or country of origin:¹				
Europe	4,299	3,951	4,469	4,866
Germany	1,432	1,484	1,843	1,965
Former USSR	1,087	833	1,115	-
Other Europe	1,780	1,634	1,511	2,901
Americas	1,421	1,297	1,606	2,366
US	1,031	982	1,175	1,356
Canada	308	265	348	956
Other America	82	50	83	54
Other regions	792	676	832	889
Permanent residence permits issued by nationality:²				
Ukraine	-	1,964	2,457	3,060
Russia	-	285	515	585
Kazakhstan	-	219	283	343
Vietnam	-	16	44	237
Vietnam	-	70	105	200
Belarus	-	146	145	225
Other countries	-	1,228	1,365	1,470
Total				

¹: Persons who entered Poland (including returning Polish emigrants) and registered in the Central Population Register (PESEL) after obtaining a permanent residence permit.

²: Data on permanent residence permits issued are not linked with data from the Central Population Register and therefore are not comparable.

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, 1997: 140.

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